How Should the Law Think About Robots
How Should the Law Think About Robots
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法律应该如何看待机器人
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Smart
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Neil M. Richards;W. Smart
机器人来了。我们的意思不是像《终结者》或《太空堡垒卡拉狄加》中那样的可怕的、世界末日的方式，也不是像《海螺之旅》中的歌曲《人类已死》那样的开玩笑的方式。我们的意思是：机器人和机器人技术现在已经足够成熟，可以离开研究实验室，大量进入消费市场。这些早期技术只是开始，我们可能很快就会见证一场个人机器人革命。这些系统有可能给我们的日常生活带来革命性的变化，并以比过去20年来广泛使用互联网和移动电话所做的更深刻的方式改变我们的世界。我们需要为它们做好准备，尤其是我们需要以正确的方式考虑它们，这样立法者才能为它们制定更好的规则，工程师们可以用保护我们社会珍视的价值观的方式来设计它们。但我们应该如何做到这一点呢？本文试图思考围绕法律、机器人和机器人学的一些概念性问题，勾勒出它们的一些影响。它利用我们作为网络法律学者和机器人专家的经验，试图在我们将面临的一些法律和技术问题上进行跨学科的第一次切割。在这篇文章中，我们提出了四点主张，即作为学者和作为一个社会，我们应该如何处理这个问题。首先，我们将机器人定义为非生物自主代理，我们认为它抓住了机器人面临的监管和技术挑战的本质，可以有效地成为监管的基础。其次，我们简要地探索了当今机器人有时令人惊讶的先进能力，并预测了机器人在未来十年左右可能能够做什么。第三，我们认为，法律和机器人技术的新生项目应该借鉴网络法律的经验，近20年来，网络法律一直在为新数字技术的问题而苦苦挣扎，具有启发性。这一经历揭示了一个特别重要的教训：当用法律术语思考新技术时，我们用来理解它们的比喻至关重要。律师习惯于以隐喻的方式理解法律主题，特别是在发展中的法律领域，如新技术。如果我们对机器人的比喻错误，网络法律的教训表明，它可能会产生灾难性的后果。最后，我们认为，应该不惜一切代价拒绝对机器人的一个特别诱人的比喻，即机器人“就像人一样”，类人机器人和非类人机器人之间存在着有意义的区别。我们称这种想法为“Android谬误”。
The robots are coming. We don’t mean this in a scary, apocalyptic way, like in The Terminator or Battlestar Galactica, or in a tongue-in-cheek way, like in the Flight of the Conchords song “The Humans are Dead.” What we mean is this: Robots and robotic technologies are now mature enough to leave the research lab and come to the consumer market in large numbers. These early technologies are just the start, and we might soon be witnessing a personal robotics revolution. These systems have the potential to revolutionize our daily lives and to transform our world in ways even more profound than broad access to the Internet and mobile phones have done over the past two decades. We need to be ready for them and, in particular, we need to think about them in the right way so that the lawmakers can craft better rules for them, and engineers can design them in ways that protect the values our society holds dear. But how should we do this?This essay is an attempt to think through some of the conceptual issues surrounding law, robots and robotics, to sketch out some of their implications. It draws on our experience as a cyberlaw scholar and a roboticist to attempt an interdisciplinary first cut at some of the legal and technological issues we will face. In the essay, we advance four claims about the ways we, as scholars and as a society, should approach this problem. First, we offer a definition of robots as non-biological autonomous agents that we think captures the essence of the regulatory and technological challenges that robots present, and which could usefully be the basis of regulation. Second, we briefly explore the sometimes surprisingly advanced capabilities of robots today, and project what robots might be able to do over the next decade or so. Third, we argue that the nascent project of law and robotics should look to the experience of cyber-law, which has struggled instructively of the problems of new digital technologies for almost two decades. This experience has revealed one particularly important lesson: when thinking about new technologies in legal terms, the metaphors we use to understand them are crucially important. Lawyers are used to understanding legal subjects metaphorically, especially in developing areas of the law like new technologies. If we get the metaphors wrong for robots, the lessons of cyber-law reveal that it could have potentially disastrous consequences. Finally, we argue that one particularly seductive metaphor for robots should be rejected at all costs, the idea that robots are “just like people” and that there is a meaningful difference between humanoid and non-humanoid robots. We call this idea “the Android Fallacy.”