Organizational Decision Making as a Political Process: The Case of a UniversityBudget.
Organizational Decision Making as a Political Process: The Case of a UniversityBudget.
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作为政治过程的组织决策：以大学预算为例。
DOI：
10.2307/2393885
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发表时间：
1974
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
G. Salancik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Pfeffer;G. Salancik
作者非常感谢Janice巴顿、Karen Riley和Ray Zammuto在数据收集方面的帮助，以及伊利诺伊大学经济和商业研究局的支持。以某高校为例，研究了子单位权力对资源配置决策的影响。在一所大学的部门权力的措施被发现是显着相关的预算收到的比例，即使在统计控制等普遍性的基础上分配的工作量的部门，国家排名和教师的数量。组织中的下属单位权力也与下属单位的资源（预算和教学人员）和长期工作量之间的相关性有关。部门越强大，分配的资源就越少，这是部门工作量和学生对课程需求的函数。次单位的权力是衡量两个部门负责人的访谈和档案记录的部门代表的主要大学委员会的分析。这些措施之间的相互关系的子单位的权力表明，它是可能的，以获得不引人注目的措施，组织的政治制度，而不直接采访。
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Janice Barton, Karen Riley, and Ray Zammuto in the data collection and the support of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Illinois. The effect of subunit power on resource allocation decisions in one university is examined. Measures of departmental power in a university are found to be significantly related to the proportion of the budget received, even after statistically controlling for such universalistic bases of allocation as work load of the department, national rank, and number of faculty. Subunit power in the organization is also related to the correlation between a subunit's resources-budget and instructional staff-and work load over time. The more powerful the department, the less the allocated resources are a function of departmental work load and student demand for course offerings. Subunit power is measured by both interviews of department heads and the analysis of archival records of departmental representation on major university committees. Intercorrelations between these measures of subunit power indicate that it is possible to obtain unobtrusive measures of organizational political systems without direct interviewing.