An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
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DOI：
10.1515/1935-1704.1849
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发表时间：
2012-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kang Rong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kang Rong
摘要我们将仲裁问题定义为一个谈判集的三元组和两个参与者提交的报价。利用公理化方法刻画了一类仲裁问题的解的特征。我们强加在仲裁解决方案上的公理是“出价的对称性”、“不变性”和“帕累托最优性”。“关键公理“出价的对称性”要求，只要参与者的出价是对称的，仲裁结果也应该是对称的。我们发现，存在一个唯一的仲裁解决方案，称为对称仲裁解决方案，满足所有三个公理。然后，我们分析了一个错误的提供游戏和交替提供游戏。在这两个游戏中，对称仲裁解决方案被用来决定结果时，球员不能达成协议，由自己。我们发现，在这两个游戏中，如果参与人的折扣因子接近1，那么唯一的子博弈完美均衡结果与Kalai-Smorodinsky解结果一致。
Abstract We define an arbitration problem as the triplet of a bargaining set and the offers submitted by two players. We characterize the solution to a class of arbitration problems using the axiomatic approach. The axioms we impose on the arbitration solution are "Symmetry in Offers,'' "Invariance'' and "Pareto Optimality.'' The key axiom, "Symmetry in Offers,'' requires that whenever players' offers are symmetric, the arbitrated outcome should also be symmetric. We find that there exists a unique arbitration solution, called the symmetric arbitration solution, that satisfies all three axioms. We then analyze a simultaneous-offer game and an alternating-offer game. In both games, the symmetric arbitration solution is used to decide the outcome whenever players cannot reach agreement by themselves. We find that in both games, if the discount factor of players is close to 1, then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution outcome.