The Fragility of Information Aggregation in Large Elections

The Fragility of Information Aggregation in Large Elections
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大型选举中信息聚合的脆弱性

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1291985
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发表时间:
2011
期刊:
Games & Political Behavior eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Michael Mandler
Michael Mandler
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Michael Mandler

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在共同价值选举中,选民收到一个关于哪个候选人更上级的信号,假设在给定正确候选人的情况下,信号结果的条件似然性存在少量不确定性。一旦解决了这种不确定性,信号就是i.i.d.跨代理。这样,信息就无法汇总。候选人不太可能是正确的给定代理人的信号可以当选的概率接近1在一个大的选民,即使信号的可能性分布是任意接近经典模型,代理人是肯定的,一个特定的可能性获得给定的特定候选人是正确的。
In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the conditional likelihood of the signalʼs outcome, given the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across agents. Information can then fail to aggregate. The candidate less likely to be correct given agentsʼ signals can be elected with probability near 1 in a large electorate even if the distribution of signal likelihoods is arbitrarily near to a classical model where agents are certain that a particular likelihood obtains given that a specific candidate is correct.