TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST MANAGEMENT UNDER THE SYSTEM OF CONCESSION LOGGING: A DECISION‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS*
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST MANAGEMENT UNDER THE SYSTEM OF CONCESSION LOGGING: A DECISION‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS*
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特许采伐制度下的热带森林砍伐和森林管理：决策理论分析*
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9787.1993.tb00232.x
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
T. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Walker;T. Smith
。特许伐木造成的森林砍伐通常是采伐决策的结果，这些决策注重短期利润而不是长期可持续采伐产量。本文开发了此类行为的顺序决策模型，该模型侧重于伐木者关于是否继续遵守特许合同条款的年度决策。该合同规定了持续森林产量的采伐程序，不遵守规定将导致森林砍伐。特许伐木者的最优决策策略以最优停止理论为特征，并用于构建鼓励遵守的回报激励。特别是，制定了森林管理问题，重点关注部分检查政策在威慑违规行为方面的有效性。建立了此类政策有效性的一般必要和充分条件，并为马尔可夫案例提供了更具操作性的形式。还开发了一个基于实际特许权合同数据的数值示例，表明了某些政策含义。
. Deforestation caused by concession logging is often the result of harvest decisions which focus on short-run profits rather than on long-run sustainable harvest yields. A sequential-decision model of this type of behavior is here developed which focuses on a logger's annual decisions of whether or not to remain in compliance with the terms of a concession contract. The contract stipulates harvesting procedures for a sustained forest yield, and noncompliance is taken to result in deforestation. An optimal decision policy for the concession logger is characterized in terms of optimal-stopping theory, and is employed to construct payoff incentives which encourage compliance. In particular, a forest management problem is formulated which focuses on the effectiveness of partial inspection policies in deterring noncompliant behavior. General necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness of such policies are established, and are given a more operational form for the Markov case. A numerical example based on actual concession-contract data is also developed which suggests certain policy implications.