Moscow's 'Near Abroad' Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe
Moscow's 'Near Abroad' Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe
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莫斯科在后苏联欧洲的“近邻”安全政策
DOI：
10.21236/ada276638
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
William C. Bodie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
William C. Bodie
苏联解体在整个欧亚大陆留下了令人不安的安全遗产。尤其令北大西洋公约组织(NATO)防务规划者担忧的是，前苏联的几个欧洲加盟共和国--乌克兰、白俄罗斯、摩尔多瓦和波罗的海诸国--的实际和潜在冲突。这一地区有7000万居民，2000枚核弹头，还有许多悬而未决的战略、经济和种族争端。这些新国家正在努力进入西方的经济和安全机构，而俄罗斯的关键人物则在敦促这些共和国在俄罗斯的领导下重新融入。莫斯科不断演变的“近邻”政策将表明，西方在21世纪将面临一个什么样的俄罗斯--民主国家、复仇主义帝国，还是无政府状态的战场。在人们生活的时候，没有一种共同的力量使他们所有人都感到敬畏，他们处于一种被称为战争的状态；这种战争是每个人对每个人的战争。--霍布斯，利维坦I：13冷战的结束，尽管对西方来说是一场非凡的战略胜利，但却让北约各国首都迷失了方向。西方规划者甚至在五年前都没有意识到的情景已经成为现实。苏联已经解体，出现了15个自治州，共和党内部的冲突已经点燃。曾经铁板一块的军队已经演变成各式各样的、自我指挥的武装力量，对3万枚核弹头的安全统一控制已经减弱。任何后华沙条约时代的欧洲音乐会都将受到前苏联帝国正在进行的革命的冲击。“俄罗斯不再具有威胁性，但它很可怕，”一名北约官员总结道。(1)这样的环境对日常的政治预测是危险的，更不用说长远的战略愿景了。西方没有经验来分析那些在经济紧缩、帝国解体和国家结构崩溃的背景下试图进行国家建设、政治民主化和经济改革的国家。(2)然而，西方政府必须认识到推动前苏联国防和外交的力量，才能预见--并先发制人--后苏联时代的欧亚大陆爆发全面战争。几个未被认识到的现实需要对俄罗斯欧洲外围的国家进行审查。(3)乌克兰共和国凭借其地缘政治地位、资源和核武器，已经是欧洲安全舞台上的主要参与者。停滞不前的白俄罗斯是垂死的独立国家联合体(独联体)的首都，尽管如此，它还是建立了自己的军队，可能会卷入一场地区冲突。1992年年中，摩尔多瓦爆发了一场激烈的战争，尽管目前西方对此不屑一顾，但它显示出与巴尔干地区可怕的相似之处。(4)波罗的海各共和国是苏联解体的先驱者，它们继续“收容”不受欢迎的俄罗斯军队和不安的斯拉夫人，他们的事业激励了莫斯科的保守派。俄罗斯对“近邻”或“近邻外国”的政策(Blizhniye Zarubezhiya)(5)将表明，21世纪的俄罗斯将是一个什么样的国家、帝国或无政府状态的战场。从塔林到雅尔塔的领土区域包括六个独立的国家，7000万居民，250多枚战略核导弹(6)和苏联经济产出的三分之一。仅乌克兰就有5200万人口(包括约1100万俄罗斯人)和欧洲第二大常备军。与中欧华沙协约国不同的是，这些共和国没有任何建国的概念，并于1991年突然独立。与俄罗斯一样，这六个国家都面临着深不可测的社会经济噩梦，尤其是每个国家都在没有摆脱共产党的情况下驱逐了自己的共产党。所有历史上“激进民族主义强烈爆发的风险因素”都存在于这些国家：“民主化、国家建设、市场化、大众传播。”…
SUMMARY The Soviet collapse bequeathed an uneasy security legacy throughout Eurasia. Especially worrisome to defense planners at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the actual and potential conflicts in the European republics of the former USSR, part of Russia's "near abroad": Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltic republics. This area contains 70 million inhabitants, two thousand nuclear warheads, and a surplus of unresolved strategic, economic, and ethnic disputes. These new nations are struggling to enter Western economic and security institutions while key Russian figures press for reintegration of the republics under Russia's leadership. Moscow's evolving policy toward the "near abroad" will indicate what kind of Russia--democratic nation, revanchist empire, or anarchic battleground the West will face in the 21st century. During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is o f every man against every man. --HOBBES, Leviathan I:13 The end of the cold war, phenomenal strategic victory though it was for the West, has disoriented NATO capitals. Scenarios that eluded Western planners even five years ago have become fact. The USSR has dissolved, 15 autonomous states have emerged, and inter-republican conflict has ignited. The once monolithic military has devolved into assorted, self-directed armed forces, and secure unitary control over thirty-thousand nuclear warheads has diminished. Any post-Warsaw Pact concert of Europe will be buffeted by the ongoing revolutions in the former Soviet empire. "Russia is no longer threatening, but it is frightening," one NATO official summed up. (1) Such an environment is hazardous for daily political forecasts, let alone long-range strategic visions. The West has no experience analyzing countries "that are attempting nation-building, political democratization, and economic reform in a context of economic austerity, imperial disintegration, and the collapse of state structures." (2) Yet Western governments must appreciate the forces driving defense and diplomacy in the former USSR in order to foresee--and forestall--general conflagration in post-Soviet Eurasia. Several unappreciated realities demand a review of the states on Russia's European periphery. (3) The Republic of Ukraine, by virtue of its geopolitical position, resources, and nuclear weapons, is already a major actor on the European security scene. Quiescent Belarus, capital of the moribund Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has nevertheless created its own army and could be drawn into a regional conflict. A shooting war erupted in Moldova in mid-1992 which, though currently ignored by the West, evinces eerie parallels to the Balkans. (4) The Baltic republics, centrifugal pioneers of the Soviet break-up, continue to "host" unwelcome Russian military units and an unsettled Slavic population whose cause has energized Moscow's conservatives. Russian policy toward the "near abroad" or "nearby foreign parts" (blizhniye zarubezhiya) (5) will indicate the kind of Russia--nation, empire, or anarchic battleground--the West will know in the 21st century. The Region The territorial are from Tallin to Yalta contains six independent countries with 70 million inhabitants, over 250 strategic nuclear missiles, (6) and a third of the economic output of the Soviet Union. Ukraine alone has a population of 52 million (including some 11 million Russians) and Europe's second largest standing army. Unlike the Central European Warsaw Pact states, these republics did not entertain any notion of statehood (7) and were thrust abruptly into independence in 1991. Like Russia, all six share unfathomable socioeconomic nightmares, not least that each has banished its Communist party without casting off its Communists. All the historical "risk factors for intense outbursts of aggressive nationalism" are present in these countries: "democratization, state building, marketization, mass communications. …