UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF , 5 / 2 / 2013 , SPi 5 . Essence and Natural Kinds : When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition
UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF , 5 / 2 / 2013 , SPi 5 . Essence and Natural Kinds : When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition
复制标题
未经校正的证明 – 第一个证明，2013 年 5 月 2 日，SPi 5. 本质与自然种类：当科学遇到学龄前儿童的直觉
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Leslie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Leslie
在哲学中，通常的做法是在论证过程中“依靠直觉”，或者有时只是为了建立一个结论。因此，一个需要解决的重要问题是：这些直觉的来源是什么？相应地：它们的认识论地位是什么？哲学讨论的进行，常常好像这些直觉来自于对事物本质的洞察，好像它们是从理性的反思和明智的洞察力中产生的。如果这些直觉不具有某种这样的地位，那么它们在哲学理论化中的作用很快就会受到怀疑。例如，我们不希望把哲学的份量放在直觉上，因为直觉实际上是早期认知偏见的未经反思的表达。发展心理学已经发现了一系列在生命最初几年出现的信念集，这些信念集可能超出了儿童在这段时间内获得的证据。在这种情况下，我们可以合理地假设，这些信念集并不仅仅来自儿童对证据的理性思考，而是显示了人类从根本上看待世界的方式。(In在某些情况下，非人类动物也具有这种根深蒂固的倾向。）关于为什么我们可能从根本上倾向于以一种特定的方式看待世界，有许多解释，其中只有一种是，从形而上学或科学的角度来说，世界实际上是这样的。另一种解释可能是，以这种方式看待世界仅仅是有用和实用的，即使它在现实的形而上学和科学结构方面误导了我们，情况也可能如此。比如说，从信息处理的角度来看，分割世界的一种特殊方式可能是有效的，而不太反映现实的基本性质。那么，假设我们发现一组特定的哲学直觉非常类似于这种早期出现的内隐信念集。这当然不能证明直觉是错误的，但它应该给我们理由对它们进行进一步的审查。这是因为这样一套直觉
It is common practice in philosophy to “rely on intuitions” in the course of an argument, or sometimes simply to establish a conclusion. One question that is therefore important to settle is: what is the source of these intuitions? Correspondingly: what is their epistemological status? Philosophical discussion often proceeds as though these intuitions stem from insight into the nature of things—as though they are born of rational reflection and judicious discernment. If these intuitions do not have some such status, then their role in philosophical theorizing rapidly becomes suspect. We would not, for example, wish to place philosophical weight on intuitions that are in effect the unreflective articulation of inchoate cognitive biases. Developmental psychology has discovered a range of belief sets that emerge in the first few years of life, and which plausibly go beyond the evidence to which the child has had access in that time period. In such cases, it is reasonable to suppose that the belief sets do not derive solely from the child’s rational reflection on her evidence, but rather show something about the way human beings are fundamentally disposed to see the world. (In some cases, the deep-seated dispositions are also shared with non-human animals.) There are many explanations of why we may be fundamentally disposed to see the world in a particular way, only one of which is that metaphysically or scientifically speaking, the world actually is that way. Another explanation may be that it is simply useful and practical to see the world that way—and this may be so even if it misleads us with respect to the metaphysical and scientific structure of reality. One particular way of carving up the world may be, say, efficient from the information processing point of view, without reflecting much about the fundamental nature of reality. Suppose, then, we find that a particular set of philosophical intuitions closely resembles such an early-emerging implicit belief set. This certainly does not establish the falsity of the intuitions, but it should give us reason to subject them to further scrutiny. This is because such a set of intuitions