Gains to Bidder Firms in Cash and Securities Transactions
Gains to Bidder Firms in Cash and Securities Transactions
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投标公司在现金和证券交易中的收益
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6288.1987.tb01263.x
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发表时间：
1987
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. C. Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James W. Wansley;W. R. Lane;H. C. Yang
本文介绍了实证检验结果的备择假设的差异，股东回报的投标公司，选择不同的支付方式（现金或证券）。这些证据与支付方式信号假说一致，该假说认为，当投标公司的管理层认为自己的股票被高估（低估）时，证券（现金）将是首选的支付方式。结果不符合超额支付假说或现值/傲慢假说。研究结果还解释了在投标公司收益的先前工作中报告的相互矛盾的结果。
This paper presents empirical test results of alternative hypotheses regarding differences in returns to shareholders of bidding firms that choose different payment methods (cash or securities). The evidence is consistent with the payment method signaling hypothesis, which asserts that when management of the bidding firm believes its own stock to be overvalued (undervalued), securities (cash) will be the preferred payment method. The results are not consistent with either the overpayment hypothesis or the present value/hubris hypothesis. The findings also explain the conflicting results reported in prior work on gains to bidding firms.