Quantifying Nations Exposure to Traffic Observation and Selective Tampering
Quantifying Nations Exposure to Traffic Observation and Selective Tampering
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-98785-5_29
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发表时间：
2021-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alexander Gamero-Garrido;Esteban Carisimo;Shuai Hao;B. Huffaker;A. Snoeren;A. Dainotti
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作者：
Alexander Gamero-Garrido;Esteban Carisimo;Shuai Hao;B. Huffaker;A. Snoeren;A. Dainotti
几乎所有流行的互联网服务都托管在一组选定的国家，迫使其他国家依赖国际连接来访问它们。我们确定了一些国家，其中大部分国家的流量由少数自治系统提供服务，因此可能会受到这些AS的观察或选择性篡改。我们引入国家一级的过境影响（CTI）指标量化的重要性，一个给定的AS对国际过境服务的一个特定的国家。通过研究每个国家顶级AS的CTI值，我们发现34个国家的过境生态系统使它们特别暴露，其中单个AS对去往其IP地址的流量超过40%。在我们能够与国内运营商验证我们的发现的国家中，我们的前五名AS平均准确率为90%。在我们研究的国家中，CTI揭示了两类网络经常发挥特别突出的作用：海底电缆运营商和国有AS。
Almost all popular Internet services are hosted in a select set of countries, forcing other nations to rely on international connectivity to access them. We identify nations where traffic towards a large portion of the country is serviced by a small number of Autonomous Systems, and, therefore, may be exposed to observation or selective tampering by these ASes. We introduce the Country-level Transit Influence (CTI) metric to quantify the significance of a given AS on the international transit service of a particular country. By studying the CTI values for the top ASes in each country, we find that 34 nations have transit ecosystems that render them particularly exposed, where a single AS is privy to traffic destined to over 40% of their IP addresses. In the nations where we are able to validate our findings with in-country operators, our top-five ASes are 90% accurate on average. In the countries we examine, CTI reveals two classes of networks frequently play a particularly prominent role: submarine cable operators and state-owned ASes.