Flying solo: Explaining single-party cabinets under minority presidentialism
Flying solo: Explaining single-party cabinets under minority presidentialism
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DOI：
10.1111/1475-6765.12275
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发表时间：
2019-02-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Power, Timothy J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chaisty, Paul;Power, Timothy J.
近年来，总统民主制的比较文学强调了联盟政治在减轻少数民族总统面临的“危险”方面的作用。然而，自1974年第三次民主化浪潮开始以来，数量惊人的少数党总统避开了内阁联盟（最低定义为将至少一个职位授予总统名义政党以外的政党）。在不到一半的时间里，观察到了单一党派政府。如何解释少数党总统采用一党内阁？横截面的时间序列分析来解决这个问题。假设进行测试，涉及到的formateur（总统）和最大的非formateur党，组成立法机构的规模和分布;党的联系和意识形态之间的距离总统和可能的党派盟友的性质;和反应的程度由总统举行的否决权。
In recent years, the comparative literature on presidential democracy has emphasised the role of coalitional politics in attenuating the 'perils' facing minority presidents. Yet since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratisation in 1974, a surprising number of minority presidents have eschewed cabinet coalitions (defined minimally as the awarding of at least one portfolio to a party other than the nominal party of the president). Unipartisan governments are observed just under half of the time. What explains the adoption of single-party cabinets by minority presidents? Cross-sectional time-series analysis is employed to address this question. Hypotheses are tested that relate to the size and distribution of the formateur (presidential) and largest non-formateur parties that make up the legislature; the nature of party linkages and ideological distance between the president and possible partisan allies; and the extent of reactive veto powers held by the president.