Does Cutting the Tax Rate to Zero Induce Behavior Different from Other Tax Cuts? Evidence from Pakistan
Does Cutting the Tax Rate to Zero Induce Behavior Different from Other Tax Cuts? Evidence from Pakistan
复制标题
将税率降至零是否会引发与其他减税措施不同的行为？
DOI：
10.1162/rest_a_00832
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
Mazhar Waseem
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mazhar Waseem
翻译后摘要使用一系列的巴基斯坦税收改革和行政记录，我的文件，应纳税所得额的反应诱导的零减税是数量级大于其他类似规模的削减。这一发现是非常强大的替代规格，并为自营职业者和工薪阶层举行。我探索的显着性，选择性执法，和不连续的逃避成本的解释所观察到的行为。我发现数据支持最后一种解释。这两组反应之间的差异主要是由一个大的，离散的逃税反应，这是包括在前者，但不包括在后者的行为。我估计这一差异是逃税的下限，表明至少有70%的中低收入自雇人士和1%的低收入工薪阶层的收入没有报告。
Abstract Using a series of Pakistani tax reforms and administrative records, I document that taxable income responses induced by to-zero tax cuts are orders of magnitude larger than ones induced by similar-sized other cuts. This finding is remarkably robust to alternative specifications and holds for both the self-employed and wage earners. I explore salience, selective enforcement, and discontinuous evasion costs as explanations of the observed behavior. I find that the data favor the last explanation. The difference between the two sets of responses is primarily driven by a large, discrete tax evasion response, which is included in the former but not in the latter behavior. I estimate the difference as a lower bound on tax evasion, showing that at least 70% of the income of low- and middle-income self-employed and 1% of low-income wage earners goes unreported.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem
通讯作者：
Michael Best;Anne Brockmeyer;H. Kleven;Johannes Spinnewijn;Mazhar Waseem