Rewards and regulation
Rewards and regulation
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/1467-6478.00209
复制
发表时间：
2002-03-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Braithwaite, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Braithwaite, J
奖励在监管中的作用不如在市场中那么有用。公司对市场激励做出反应，因为大多数市场都是可竞争的。在不是寡头垄断的市场中，采取竞争心态比固定心态更有意义。相比之下，监管权力在很大程度上是不可争辩的。因此，公司更有可能采取一种中间人或博弈心态。通过奖励对监管控制的抵触很可能大于对市场纪律的抵触。如果响应性监管金字塔是优化合规的好策略，那么惩罚在监管中比奖励更有用。处于监管机构金字塔中间的薪酬会带来道德风险问题。在某些有限的条件下，奖励在监管金字塔的底部可能是有用的。这些条件是透明的、容易衡量要奖励的表现、权力不平衡以至于被监管者与监管者相比是软弱的，以及没有弱者的武器来颠覆弱者受制于的监管体系。在没有这些条件的情况下，我们不能指望一个市场无疑具有效率优势，在这个市场，监管结果可以进行交易，以便在这样做的成本最低的地方获得担保。一般来说，对监管者来说，惩罚比金钱奖励更有用，但在确保合规方面，非正式奖励(表扬、表彰)更是始终如一的有用。
Rewards are less useful in regulation than they are in markets. Firms respond to market incentives because most markets are contestable. In markets that are not oligopolies it makes more sense to adopt a competitor mentality than a fixer mentality. Regulatory power in contrast is mostly not contestable. Firms are therefore more likely to adopt a fixer or game-playing mentality. Reactance to regulatory control through rewards is likely to be greater than reactance to market discipline. If a responsive regulatory pyramid is a good strategy for optimizing compliance, then punishment is more useful in regulation than reward. Reward at the middle of a regulator pyramid brings about a moral hazard problem. Under certain limited conditions reward can be useful at the base of a regulatory pyramid. These conditions are transparent, easy measurement of the performance to be rewarded, an imbalance of power such that the regulatee is weak in comparison to the regulator, and an absence of weapons of the weak for subverting a regulatory system to which the weak are subject. Absent these conditions, and we cannot expect the undoubted efficiency advantages of a market where regulatory outcomes can be traded so that they are secured where the cost of doing so is least. While, in general, punishments are more useful to regulators than monetary rewards, informal rewards (praise, letters of recognition) are rather consistently useful in securing compliance.