Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets under Competition
Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets under Competition
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1308848
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发表时间：
2013-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Gallego;Ming Hu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Gallego;Ming Hu
本文研究了一个寡头垄断市场中易逝性资产可替代和互补的动态价格竞争。每家公司都有固定的初始库存，并在有限的销售期内竞争定价销售。顾客依次到达市场，做出购买选择，然后立即离开，有可能不购买。购买可能性取决于购买时间、产品属性和当前价格。需求结构包括时变线性和多项式logit需求模型作为特殊情况。假设确定性的客户到达率，我们表明，任何均衡策略都有一个简单的结构，涉及一组有限的影子价格测量能力的外部性，企业施加在对方：均衡价格可以解决一个一次性的价格竞争游戏下的当前时间的需求结构，考虑到能力的外部性，通过时不变的影子价格。前者反映了每时每刻的瞬时需求方，而后者则反映了销售范围内的总供应约束。这个简单的结构揭示了竞争下的动态收益管理问题，这有助于捕捉需求不确定性下的问题的本质。我们表明，从确定性博弈的均衡解提供预承诺和偶然的启发式政策，其随机对应的渐近均衡，当需求和供给是足够大的。这篇论文被运营管理部门的Yossi Aviv接受。
We study dynamic price competition in an oligopolistic market with a mix of substitutable and complementary perishable assets. Each firm has a fixed initial stock of items and competes in setting prices to sell them over a finite sales horizon. Customers sequentially arrive at the market, make a purchase choice, and then leave immediately with some likelihood of no purchase. The purchase likelihood depends on the time of purchase, product attributes, and current prices. The demand structure includes time-variant linear and multinomial logit demand models as special cases. Assuming deterministic customer arrival rates, we show that any equilibrium strategy has a simple structure, involving a finite set of shadow prices measuring capacity externalities that firms exert on each other: equilibrium prices can be solved from a one-shot price competition game under the current-time demand structure, taking into account capacity externalities through the time-invariant shadow prices. The former reflects the transient demand side at every moment, and the latter captures the aggregate supply constraints over the sales horizon. This simple structure sheds light on dynamic revenue management problems under competition, which helps capture the essence of the problems under demand uncertainty. We show that the equilibrium solutions from the deterministic game provide precommitted and contingent heuristic policies that are asymptotic equilibria for its stochastic counterpart, when demand and supply are sufficiently large. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.