Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms
Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms
复制标题
随机机制的最优价格歧视
DOI：
10.1145/3490486.3538335
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Munagala, Kamesh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ko, Shao-Heng;Munagala, Kamesh
我们研究了双边贸易中通过中介的价格歧视的力量，当有一个收入最大化的卖方出售物品给买方的私人价值从一个先验。在卖方和买方之间，有一个中介，通过向卖方发布关于真实价值的信息来分割市场。这被称为信号传递，使卖方能够进行价格歧视。在这种情况下，Bergemann等人。表明存在一个信号方案，同时提高最优消费者剩余，保证该项目总是销售，并确保卖方的收入不增加。我们的工作扩展了Bergemann等人的积极结果。到类型空间更大的设置，以及最优拍卖是随机的，可能是在一个指数级大的菜单上。特别是，我们考虑两种由预算驱动的设置：第一种是当卖方可以收取的价格有一个公开的预算约束时，第二种是FedEx问题，其中买方有一个私人的最后期限或服务水平（相当于，一个保证永远不会绑定的私人预算）。对于这两种设置，我们提出了一种新的信号方案和分析，通过一个连续的建设过程，重新创建最佳的消费者剩余保证Bergemann等人。并且进一步将它们的信令方案归入为特殊情况。实际上，我们的研究结果显示，即使最优拍卖是随机在一个可能的大菜单，有一个市场细分，这样对于每一个部分，最优拍卖是一个简单的张贴价格方案，该项目总是selled.The设置，我们认为是更一般的问题，买家有一个私人的预算约束，除了一个私人价值的特殊情况。最后，我们表明，我们的积极结果不延伸到这个更一般的设置，特别是当预算可以约束在最优拍卖，当卖方的机制允许全付拍卖。在这里，我们表明，任何有效的信号发送方案必然会将几乎所有的剩余转移到卖方，而不是买方。
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an intermediary that cansegmentthe market by releasing information about the true values to the seller. This is termed signaling, and enables the seller to price discriminate. In this setting, Bergemann et al. showed the existence of a signaling scheme that simultaneously raises the optimal consumer surplus, guarantees the item always sells, and ensures the seller’s revenue does not increase.Our work extends the positive result of Bergemann et al. to settings where the type space is larger, and where the optimal auction is randomized, possibly over a menu that can be exponentially large. In particular, we consider two settings motivated by budgets: The first is when there is a publicly known budget constraint on the price the seller can charge and the second is the FedEx problem where the buyer has a private deadline or service level (equivalently, a private budget that is guaranteed to never bind). For both settings, we present a novel signaling scheme and its analysis via a continuous construction process that recreates the optimal consumer surplus guarantee of Bergemann et al. and further subsumes their signaling scheme as a special case. In effect, our results show settings where even though the optimal auction is randomized over a possibly large menu, there is a market segmentation such that for each segment, the optimal auction is a simple posted price scheme where the item is always sold.The settings we consider are special cases of the more general problem where the buyer has a private budget constraint in addition to a private value. We finally show that our positive results do not extend to this more general setting, particularly when the budget can bind in the optimal auction, and when the seller’s mechanism allows for all-pay auctions. Here, we show that any efficient signaling scheme necessarily transfers almost all the surplus to the seller instead of the buyer.
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3145000
发表时间：
2017-02
期刊：
ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Bergemann;S. Morris
通讯作者：
D. Bergemann;S. Morris
DOI：
10.1137/1.9781611975994.149
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
Proceedings of the Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
影响因子：
--
作者：
Cummings, Rachel;Devanur, Nikhil R.;Huang, Zhiyi;Wang, Xianging
通讯作者：
Wang, Xianging
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
SeCO Workshops
影响因子：
--
作者：
S. Dughmi
通讯作者：
S. Dughmi
DOI：
10.1145/3490486.3538370
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
--
作者：
Alijani, Reza;Banerjee, Siddhartha;Munagala, Kamesh;Wang, Kangning
通讯作者：
Wang, Kangning
影响因子：
1.2
作者：
Raghuvansh R. Saxena;Ariel Schvartzman;S. Weinberg
通讯作者：
S. Weinberg