Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem
Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem
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其他身体，其他思想：一个古老哲学问题的机器化身
DOI：
10.1007/bf00360578
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发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
7.4
通讯作者：
S. Harnad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Harnad
任何试图通过制造具有心灵的机器来解释心灵的尝试都必须面对他者心灵的问题：当我们知道的唯一方法是成为另一个身体时，我们如何才能知道除了我们自己的身体之外的任何身体是否有心灵？在实践中，我们都使用某种形式的图灵测试：如果它能做一个有思想的身体能做的一切，以至于我们不能区分它们，我们就没有理由怀疑它有思想。但是，什么是“一切”的身体与思想可以做什么？图灵最初的“笔友”版本的图灵测试（TT）只测试语言能力，但塞尔已经表明，一个没有头脑的符号操纵者可以通过TT而不被发现。总图灵测试（TTT）要求我们所有的语言和机器人的能力;免疫塞尔的论点，它建议如何地面符号操纵系统的能力，挑选出它的符号所指的对象。然而，没有图灵测试可以保证身体有思想。更糟糕的是，在解释它的成功表现时，根本不需要模型有头脑。因此，心灵与物理学的不可观测性非常不同（例如，超弦）;而图灵测试，虽然对大脑的机器建模至关重要，但实际上只能产生对身体的解释。
Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is “everything” a body with a mind can do? Turing's original “pen-pal” version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.