Effluent taxation in monopoly markets
Effluent taxation in monopoly markets
复制标题
垄断市场中的污水税
DOI：
10.1016/0095-0696(80)90012-1
复制
发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
W. Misiolek
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Misiolek
Asch和Seneca （A + S）在最近一期的本刊中证明，垄断企业对外部成本的完全内部化有时会带来社会福利收益，有时则不会。决定盈利还是亏损的关键因素是外部成本相对于垄断者的价格成本边际的大小。如果外部性的完全内部化是不可取的，A + S指出，部分内部化可能比不内部化更好，但不要制定一种确定最合适的内部化程度的方法。在本文中，A + S分析被扩展为推导出一个排放税公式，该公式确定了在以（某种程度）垄断力量为特征的市场中实现资源有效配置所需的内部化程度。3个图，6个参考文献。
Asch and Seneca (A + S) demonstrate in a recent issue of this journal that complete internalization of external cost by a monopoly firm will sometimes result in a social-welfare gain and sometimes will not. The critical factor in determining whether a gain or a loss will occur is the size of external cost relative to the monopolist's price-cost margin. If full internalization of the externality is undesirable, A + S note that partial internalization may be preferable to none, but do not develop a method of determining the degree of internalization that is most appropriate. In this note, the A + S analysis is extended to derive an emissions-tax formula which establishes the extent of internalization required to achieve an efficient allocation of resources in markets characterized by (some degree) monopoly power. 3 figures, 6 references.