Non-marketization bargaining and actual compensation level for land requisition: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of China’s land requisition conflict events
Non-marketization bargaining and actual compensation level for land requisition: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of China’s land requisition conflict events
复制标题
非市场化讨价还价与征地实际补偿水平：中国征地冲突事件的定性比较分析
DOI：
10.3390/su11216084
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Zhenqi Fu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li Huang;Shougeng Hu;Shixiang Li;Zhenqi Fu
在我国现行征地制度下，地方政府被赋予了单方面确定征地补偿标准的权力。然而，针对官方过低的征地补偿，希望参与土地增量收益分配的失地农民通常会选择各种“非市场化”的议价方式与地方政府谈判。这在一定程度上放松了官方征地补偿水平的刚性，使实际征地补偿水平在现实中存在巨大的变数。为了揭示我国实际征地补偿水平的决定因素，本文分析了失地农民的谈判能力、谈判策略、外部干预等非市场化谈判因素之间的因果关系，以2002年至2017年发生的70起征地冲突事件为出发点，分析了征地补偿的实际水平。实证分析结果表明，如果失地农民具有较强的讨价还价能力，放弃激进的讨价还价策略，而采用相对温和的讨价还价策略，则可以有效地迫使地方政府在征地补偿水平上做出让步和妥协。这不仅丰富了现有的社会权力结构研究，而且对正在进行的征地制度改革也具有借鉴意义。
Under China’s current land requisition system, local governments are endowed with the power to unilaterally set the compensation level for land requisition. However, in response to the official overly low compensation for land requisition, the land-losing farmers hoping to participate in the distribution of land increment revenue usually choose various “non- marketization” bargaining methods to negotiate with local governments. To a certain extent, this has relaxed the rigidity of the official compensation level for land requisition and made the actual compensation level for land requisition tremendously variable in reality. In order to uncover thedeterminants of the actual compensation level for land requisition in China, we analyzes the causal relationship between non-marketization bargaining factors, like land-losing farmers’ bargaining ability, bargaining strategy, external intervention, etc., and the actual compensation level for land requisition by taking the 70 land requisition conflict events occurring from 2002 to 2017 as the point of departure. The results of the empirical analysis show that if land-losing farmers have a relatively strong bargaining ability, forgo a radical bargaining strategy, and use a relatively gentle bargaining strategy instead, they can effectively force local governments to make concessions and compromises on the compensation level for land requisition. We not only enriches the existing research on the structure of social power, but it also has significance for the ongoing reform of the land requisition system.