A POSITIVE THEORY OF MONETARY-POLICY IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL
A POSITIVE THEORY OF MONETARY-POLICY IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL
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DOI：
10.1086/261167
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发表时间：
1983-01-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
GORDON, DB
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BARRO, RJ;GORDON, DB
自由裁量的政策制定者可能会制造令人惊讶的通胀，这可能会减少就业并增加政府收入。但当人们理解政策制定者的目标时，这些意外就不可能系统地发生。在均衡中，人们理性地形成预期，政策制定者在每个时期进行优化，这取决于人们形成预期的方式。然后，我们发现(1)货币增长率和通货膨胀率是过度的；(2)这些增长率取决于菲利普斯曲线的斜率、自然失业率和其他影响通货膨胀收益和成本的变量；(3)货币当局的行为是逆周期的；(4)失业率与货币政策无关。如果规则以适当的方式承诺未来的政策选择，结果会有所改善。这些承诺的价值--相当于政府和私营部门之间的长期合同--为制定自由裁量权规则奠定了基础。
A discretionary policymaker can create surprise inflation, which may reduce employment and raise government revenue. But when people understand the policymaker's objectives, these surprises cannot occur systematically. In equilibrium people form expectations rationally and the policymaker optimizes in each period, subject to the way that people form expectations. Then, we find that (1) the rates of monetary growth and inflation are excessive; (2) these rates depend on the slope of Phillips curve, the natural unemployment rate, and other variables that affect the benefits and costs from inflation; (3) the monetary authority behaves countercyclically; and (4) unemployment is independent of money policy. Outcomes improve if rules commit future policy choices in the appropriate manner. The value of these commitments--which amount to long-term contracts between the government and the private sector--underlies the argument for rules over discretion.