The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers
The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers
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DOI：
10.1093/mind/fzt082
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发表时间：
2013-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Barker, Stephen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barker, Stephen
本文认为，新权力形而上学，又称性情本质主义或因果结构主义，是一种虚幻的形而上学。我以如下方式对此进行论证。我开始要区分三种基本的方式来观察物理模态的事实--关于物理必然性和可能性、因果关系、倾向和偶然性的事实--是如何在世界中扎根的。第一种方式，称之为第一程度，是实际世界或所有世界，在其整体上，是物理模态的来源。休谟主义是最著名的这种方法，但还有其他不太知名的方法。第二种方式，即第二度，是物理模态的来源在于某些二阶事实，涉及共相之间的关系。阿姆斯特朗的必然论和其他观点是第二度观点。第三种方式，第三度，认为属性本身是物理模态的来源。这就是权力观。我研究了发展第三度的四种方式：关系构成，图论结构主义，性格角色和强大的品质。所有这些方法要么是不连贯的，要么只是一级的伪装版本。新的权力形而上学是虚幻的。随着第三层次的崩溃，第二层次，即必然主义的法律观，也随之崩溃。最后，我对第一层次、解释不同存在之间的必然联系的问题以及整体论本体论的暗淡前景进行了一些反思。
This paper argues that the new metaphysics of powers, also known as dispositional essentialism or causal structuralism, is an illusory metaphysics. I argue for this in the following way. I begin by distinguishing three fundamental ways of seeing how facts of physical modality - facts about physical necessitation and possibility, causation, disposition, and chance - are grounded in the world. The first way, call it the first degree, is that the actual world or all worlds, in their entirety, are the source of physical modality. Humeanism is the best known such approach, but there are other less well-known approaches. The second way, the second degree, is that the source of physical modality lies in certain second-order facts, involving a relation between universals. Armstrong's necessitarianism and other views are second-degree views. The third way, the third degree, holds that properties themselves are the source of physical modality. This is the powers view. I examine four ways of developing the third degree: relational constitution, graph-theoretic structuralism, dispositional roles, and powerful qualities. All these ways are either incoherent, or just disguised versions of the first-degree. The new metaphysics of powers is illusory. With the collapse of the third degree, the second degree, the necessitarian view of law, collapses as well. I end the paper with some reflections on the first degree, on the problem of explaining necessary connections between distinct existences, and on the dim prospects of holist ontology.