Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems
Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems
复制标题
种族权力共享：三大问题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Horowitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Horowitz
在因民族、种族、宗教、语言或任何其他形式的归属关系而严重分裂的社会中，民族分裂使民主变得困难，因为它们往往产生民族政党和民族选举。两种常用的改进方法被称为联合和向心。这些建议产生了三个问题：第一个问题涉及两个主要处方中的任何一个的可接受性。在什么条件下可以采用哪一种？第二个问题涉及向心性政权固有的一种可能性：维持种族间联盟的选举安排的潜在退化。第三个原因源于采用联合政权的一个共同后果：在采用强有力的保证（包括少数人否决）的地方，不动主义很有可能出现，而且很难克服不动主义可能产生的停滞。通过检查这三个问题，我们可以发现这两个常见处方中固有的一些弱点。
In societies severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, language, or any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions make democracy difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Two commonly proposed methods of amelioration are called consociational and centripetal. Three problems derive from these proposals: The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either be adopted? The second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalition. The third derives from a common consequence of the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce. By examining these three problems, we can uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the common prescriptions.