The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts
The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts
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次级抵押贷款合同的法律、经济学和心理学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
O. Bar‐Gill
中科院分区：
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作者：
O. Bar‐Gill
2006年发放的次级贷款超过400万笔，使未偿还次级贷款总额超过万亿美元。几个月后，次贷危机爆发，止赎率飙升，借款人、贷款人、社区和城市遭受数千亿甚至数万亿美元的损失，更不用说对美国和世界经济产生更广泛的影响。在本文中，我重点讨论次级抵押贷款合同及其中心设计特征。我认为这些合同设计特征可以解释为对借款人不完美理性的理性市场反应。因此，对于许多次级借款人来说，贷款合同并不是福利最大化。就次级抵押贷款合同的设计导致次贷危机而言，借款人的福利损失本身就很大，而且更广泛的社会成本也加剧了这种损失。最后，我认为，更好地理解产生这些低效合同的市场失灵应该为正在进行的次级抵押市场监管改革努力提供信息。
Over 4 million subprime loans were originated in 2006, bringing the total value of outstanding subprime loans over a trillion dollars. A few months later the subprime crisis began, with soaring foreclosure rates and hundreds of billions, perhaps trillions, of dollars in losses to borrowers, lenders, neighborhoods and cities, not to mention broader effects on the US and world economy. In this Article, I focus on the subprime mortgage contract and its central design features. I argue that these contractual design features can be explained as a rational market response to the imperfect rationality of borrowers. Accordingly, for many subprime borrowers loan contracts were not welfare maximizing. And to the extent that the design of subprime mortgage contracts contributed to the subprime crisis, the welfare loss to borrowers, substantial in itself, is compounded by much broader social costs. Finally, I argue that a better understanding of the market failure that produced these inefficient contracts should inform the ongoing efforts to reform the regulations governing the subprime market.