Determining market power exertion between buyers and sellers
Determining market power exertion between buyers and sellers
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DOI：
10.1002/1099-1255(200005/06)15:3
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发表时间：
2000-05
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
K. Raper;H. Alan Love;C. Richard Shumway
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Raper;H. Alan Love;C. Richard Shumway
产业组织中常用的衡量市场力量发挥的经验技术通常假设市场一侧的企业存在不完全竞争行为。另一方的企业被认为是完全竞争的。在本文中，我们扩展了传统的 NEIO 方法，开发了一种当双方企业都具有潜在市场力量时估计市场力量发挥的方法。使用蒙特卡罗模拟，我们发现该模型正确地估计了市场一侧或两侧的企业所行使的市场力量，并且还正确地估计了企业的技术参数。当应用于美国烟叶市场时，调查结果表明，卷烟制造商在购买烟叶时发挥了一定的垄断力量，而以卡特尔形式组织的生产商则没有表现出反补贴的垄断市场力量。版权所有 © 2000 约翰·威利父子有限公司
Empirical techniques commonly used in industrial organization to measure market power exertion typically assume imperfectly competitive behaviour by firms on only one side of the market. Firms on the other side are assumed to be perfectly competitive. In this paper we extend traditional NEIO methods by developing a method to estimate market power exertion when firms on both sides have potential market power. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the model correctly estimates market power exercised by firms on either or both sides of a market and also correctly estimates firms' technology parameters. When applied to the US leaf tobacco market, findings indicate that cigarette manufacturers exert some monopsony power in purchasing leaf tobacco while producers, organized as a cartel, exhibit no countervailing monopoly market power. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.