Verifiable Oblivious Storage

Verifiable Oblivious Storage
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可验证的不经意存储

DOI:
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public Key Cryptography
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Aishwarya Thiruvengadam
Aishwarya Thiruvengadam
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Daniel Apon;Jonathan Katz;E. Shi;Aishwarya Thiruvengadam

文献摘要

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我们将可验证的不经意存储VOS的概念正式化,其中客户端将数据存储外包给服务器,同时确保数据机密性、访问模式隐私以及数据访问的完整性和新鲜性。VOS概括了不经意的RAM ORAM的概念,因为它允许服务器执行计算,并显式地考虑数据的完整性和新鲜性。 我们证明,允许服务器端计算使我们能够构造渐近更有效的VOS方案,由于Goldreich和Ostrovsky已知的下界,其带宽开销是任何Oram方案都无法匹配的。具体地说,对于较大的块大小,我们可以构造每个查询具有恒定带宽的VOS方案;此外,回答查询只需要多对数服务器计算。我们描述了VOS在可检索性动态证明和RAM模型安全多方计算中的应用。
We formalize the notion of Verifiable Oblivious Storage VOS, where a client outsources the storage of data to a server while ensuring data confidentiality, access pattern privacy, and integrity and freshness of data accesses. VOS generalizes the notion of Oblivious RAM ORAM in that it allows the server to perform computation, and also explicitly considers data integrity and freshness. We show that allowing server-side computation enables us to construct asymptotically more efficient VOS schemes whose bandwidth overhead cannot be matched by any ORAM scheme, due to a known lower bound by Goldreich and Ostrovsky. Specifically, for large block sizes we can construct a VOS scheme with constant bandwidth per query; further, answering queries requires only poly-logarithmic server computation. We describe applications of VOS to Dynamic Proofs of Retrievability, and RAM-model secure multi-party computation.