Tax Evasion, Minimum Wage Non-Compliance and Informality
Tax Evasion, Minimum Wage Non-Compliance and Informality
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逃税、不遵守最低工资和不正规行为
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zahra Siddique
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Basu;Nancy H. Chau;Zahra Siddique
我们研究了税收和最低工资改革对非正规性发生率的影响。为了衡量非正规劳动力的发生率，我们使用逃税的程度，不遵守最低工资的程度和非正规劳动力的规模的措施。我们的方法使我们能够检查（一）企业层面的报告工资分布和实际工资分布的决定因素之间的区别，（二）税收和最低工资执法的互补性，（三）最低工资改革对税收和最低工资合规性的影响，以及（四）税收政策改革对税收和最低工资合规性的影响。我们的结论与最佳最低工资和税收政策的设计（即使在完全没有最低工资的执行）。我们这样做是基于两个目标，这两个目标来自于与非正规经济不受限制的扩张相关的普遍担忧：税收最大化和减轻工人的贫困。
We study the impact of tax and minimum wage reforms on the incidence of informality. To gauge the incidence of informality, we use measures of the extent of tax evasion, the extent of minimum wage non-compliance, and the size of the informal workforce. Our approach allows us to examine (i) the distinction between determinants of firm-level reported wage distribution and actual wage distribution, (ii) the complementarity of tax and minimum wage enforcement, (iii) the impact that a minimum wage reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance, and (iv) the impact that a tax policy reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance. We conclude with the design of optimal minimum wage and tax policies (even in the complete absence of minimum wage enforcement). We do so based on two objectives derived from popular concerns associated with an unchecked expansion of informality: tax revenue maximization, and poverty alleviation among workers.
劳动法规和非正规性的执行
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
Almeida R
通讯作者：
Almeida R