Law Enforcement with a Democratic Government
Law Enforcement with a Democratic Government
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民主政府的执法
DOI：
10.1093/aler/ahw015
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Marie Obidzinski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Éric Langlais;Marie Obidzinski
在这篇文章中，我们分析了政治竞争如何影响公共执法政策的设计。本文得出了两个主要结论（假设执行成本是线性的，罪犯的类型是均匀分布的，社会是足够富裕的）：（1）选举竞争不会导致轻微和重大犯罪的均衡效率损失（例如，（2）均衡状态下的扭曲只发生在中等犯罪范围内：小犯罪的执法支出低于最优水平，从而加剧了威慑不足的问题;相比之下，对于更严重的罪行，执行措施更高，与效率要求相比，威慑（可能是过度的）。我们发现，这些结果也概括下更一般的假设，除了完全威慑的重大罪行不再是可以实现的（一个不太富裕的社会），或执法支出是有界的（凸执法成本下）。
In this article, we analyze how political competition affects the design of public law enforcement policies. The article arrives at two main conclusions (assuming that the cost of enforcement is linear, criminal’s type is uniformly distributed, and the society is wealthy enough): (1) electoral competition entails no loss of efficiency at equilibrium for both minor and major offenses (e.g., minor offenses are not enforced, while major ones are fully deterred); (2) distortions arises at equilibrium only in the range of intermediate offenses: enforcement expenditure for small offenses is lower than at optimal level, such that the issue of under-deterrence is exacerbated; in contrast, for more serious offenses, enforcement measures are higher, and there is more (possibly, over) deterrence as compared to what efficiency requires. We show that these results also generalize under more general assumptions, except that full deterrence of major offenses is no longer achievable (a less wealthy society), or enforcement expenditure is bounded above (under convex enforcement costs).