Optimal Contracts with Lock-In
Optimal Contracts with Lock-In
复制标题
锁定最优合约
DOI：
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发表时间：
1987
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Shapiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joseph Farrell;C. Shapiro
作者分析了不完全的长期合同，当买方承担特定的关系建立成本和卖方选择的产品或服务质量是不可验证的第三方。如果启动成本是可观察的，即使合同不能明确规定质量，也可以实现最佳结果;这甚至不需要长期合同。然而，如果启动成本是不可观察的，那么长期价格合同的表现可以严格优于短期合同。均衡可能涉及无效率的低质量，没有买方转换或有效的质量与无效的转换。对转换征税的政策，或“破坏”第三方的可用性，可以改善福利。版权所有1989年美国经济协会。
The authors analyze incomplete long-term contracts when buyers incur relationship-specific set-up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties. If set-up costs are observable, the first-best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot enforceably specify quality; this does not even require long-term contracts. If set-up costs are unobservable, however, then long-term price contracts can strictly outperform short-term contracts. Equilibrium may involve either inefficiently low quality with no buyer switching or efficient quality with inefficient switching. A policy of taxing switching, or the availability of "budget-breaking" third parties, can improve welfare. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
HART, O;MOORE, J
通讯作者：
MOORE, J