Polarization and Inefficient Policies
Polarization and Inefficient Policies
复制标题
两极分化和低效政策
DOI：
10.2307/2297855
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christian Schultz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christian Schultz
双方有不同的目标。选民，而不是政党，不确定经济的运作，在这种情况下，生产公共产品的成本。各党各自提出一项政策，举行选举，执行获胜党的政策。选民和政党关心公共利益和成本的水平。存在两种顺序均衡：揭示性均衡，选民了解真实成本，实施的政策根据成本进行调整;非揭示性均衡。如果各方的偏好是两极分化的，只有非揭示性均衡满足像直觉标准这样的细化标准。如果它们是相同的，那么只有揭示性均衡满足这个标准。因此，较少的政治两极分化改善了信息披露。
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy, in this case the costs of producing a public good. The parties each propose a policy, an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented. Voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist; revealing, where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs, and non-revealing. If parties' preferences are polarized only non-revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion. If they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion. Thus less political polarization improves information revelation.