Author's Personal Copy Theoretical Computer Science Economic Models for Cloud Service Markets: Pricing and Capacity Planning
Author's Personal Copy Theoretical Computer Science Economic Models for Cloud Service Markets: Pricing and Capacity Planning
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通讯作者：
R. Pal;Pan Hui
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作者：
R. Pal;Pan Hui
在大多数情况下，作者被允许将其文章版本（例如Word或Tex格式）发布到个人网站或机构知识库。鼓励需要有关爱思唯尔存档和稿件政策更多信息的作者访问：摘要 云计算是一种范式，它有可能通过将软件作为服务提供给终端用户来改变和革新下一代信息技术产业。云，通常也被称为云网络，一般由硬件（服务器网络）和一系列软件组成，这些软件以按需付费的方式提供给终端用户。在云计算市场中并存的多个公共云提供商（例如亚马逊）在应用性质以及服务质量（QoS）提供方面，都向其客户提供类似的服务（软件即服务）。从长远来看，云是否托管（或发现托管有利可图）一项服务的决策将共同取决于它设定的价格、它向客户提供的QoS保证以及所宣传保证的满意度。在本文的第一部分，我们设计并分析了三种与云网络相关的组织间经济模型。我们将问题表述为云市场中多个云提供商之间的非合作价格和QoS博弈。我们证明在三个模型中的两个存在唯一的纯策略纳什均衡（NE）。我们的分析为每个云提供商了解针对给定服务类型的终端用户应设定什么价格和QoS水平铺平了道路，以便该提供商能够在云市场中生存。云提供商代表云客户处理终端用户请求，并且由于用户需求随时间的不确定性，往往会过度配置诸如CPU、电力、内存、存储等资源，以满足QoS保证。由于在长时间尺度上的过度配置，服务器利用率非常低，云提供商不得不承担不必要的浪费成本。在这方面，云提供商设定的价格和QoS水平驱动终端用户需求，这在云提供商估计满足其宣传保证的最小容量方面起着重要作用。所谓“容量”，我们指的是云处理用户请求的能力，即单位时间内处理的用户请求数量，这反过来又决定了……
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: a b s t r a c t Cloud computing is a paradigm that has the potential to transform and revolutionalize the next generation IT industry by making software available to end-users as a service. A cloud, also commonly known as a cloud network, typically comprises of hardware (network of servers) and a collection of softwares that is made available to end-users in a pay-as-you-go manner. Multiple public cloud providers (e.g., Amazon) co-existing in a cloud computing market provide similar services (software as a service) to its clients, both in terms of the nature of an application, as well as in quality of service (QoS) provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts (or finds it profitable to host) a service in the long-term would depend jointly on the price it sets, the QoS guarantees it provides to its customers, and the satisfaction of the advertised guarantees. In the first part of the paper, we devise and analyze three inter-organizational economic models relevant to cloud networks. We formulate our problems as non cooperative price and QoS games between multiple cloud providers existing in a cloud market. We prove that a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) exists in two of the three models. Our analysis paves the path for each cloud provider to know what prices and QoS level to set for end-users of a given service type, such that the provider could exist in the cloud market. A cloud provider services end-user requests on behalf of cloud customers, and due to the uncertainty in user demands over time, tend to over-provision resources like CPU, power, memory, storage, etc., in order to satisfy QoS guarantees. As a result of over-provisioning over long timescales, server utilization is very low and the cloud providers have to bear unnecessarily wasteful costs. In this regard, the price and QoS levels set by the CPs drive the end-user demand, which plays a major role in CPs estimating the minimal capacity to meet their advertised guarantees. By the term 'capacity', we imply the ability of a cloud to process user requests, i.e., number of user requests processed per unit of time, which in turn determine the …