Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Bayesian Philosophy of Science
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贝叶斯科学哲学

DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
S. Hartmann
S. Hartmann
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
J. Sprenger;S. Hartmann

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《贝叶斯科学哲学》探讨了科学哲学中的经典话题,使用了一个单一的关键概念--信仰度--以解释和阐明科学推理的多个方面。其基本思想是,令人信服的证据、良好的解释、理论间的推断等等的价值,都可以通过它对我们的信仰程度的影响来体现。这个想法被详细地描述为围绕这样一个主题的变化周期,即通过主观概率来表示信仰的合理程度,并通过特定的规则(贝叶斯条件化)来改变它们。在某种程度上,这本书致力于Carnapian传统,即使用贝叶斯模型(例如,确认度、因果关系强度、解释能力)来解释科学推理中的基本概念。在一定程度上,它为学习条件证据和更新旧证据等旧问题开发了新的解决方案,并为科学中的重要论点方案提供了模型,如没有替代论点、没有奇迹论点或对最佳解释的推断。最后,解释了科学应用中的贝叶斯推理--尤其是统计学--如何与实践者的要求相一致,以及主观推理学派如何声称科学的客观性。这本书整合了概念分析、形式模型、模拟、案例研究和经验发现,试图为21世纪的科学哲学指引方向。
“Bayesian Philosophy of Science” addresses classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept—degrees of beliefs—in order to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. The basic idea is that the value of convincing evidence, good explanations, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, can all be captured by the effect it has on our degrees of belief. This idea is elaborated as a cycle of variations about the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities, and changing them by a particular rule (Bayesian Conditionalization). Partly, the book is committed to the Carnapian tradition of explicating essential concepts in scientific reasoning using Bayesian models (e.g., degree of confirmation, causal strength, explanatory power). Partly, it develops new solutions to old problems such as learning conditional evidence and updating on old evidence, and it models important argument schemes in science such as the No Alternatives Argument, the No Miracles Argument or Inference to the Best Explanation. Finally, it is explained how Bayesian inference in scientific applications—above all, statistics—can be squared with the demands of practitioners and how a subjective school of inference can make claims to scientific objectivity. The book integrates conceptual analysis, formal models, simulations, case studies and empirical findings in an attempt to lead the way for 21th century philosophy of science.