Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space: A corrigendum
Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space: A corrigendum
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用独特的主观状态空间表示偏好：勘误表
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Sarver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eddie Dekel;Barton L. Lipman;A. Rustichini;T. Sarver
Dekel， Lipman和Rustichini(2001)（以下简称DLR）明确地描述了偏好的三种表现形式，允许对灵活性和/或承诺的渴望。在其中一种表示（序数期望效用）中，独立性公理以比获得该表示所需的更弱的形式陈述；在另一种情况下（附加期望效用），连续性公理太弱。在这个勘误中，我们提供了一些例子来证明DLR所使用的公理是不充分的，并提供了这些公理的更强的版本，与DLR所使用的其他公理一起，对于这两个表示是充分必要的。版权所有计量经济学会2007。
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive expected utility), the continuity axiom is too weak. In this erratum we provide examples showing that the axioms used by DLR are not sufficient, and provide stronger versions of these axioms that, together with the other axioms used by DLR, are necessary and sufficient for these two representations. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.