Negotiating the Use of Biodiversity in Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
Negotiating the Use of Biodiversity in Marine Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
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DOI：
10.3389/fmars.2016.00224
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发表时间：
2016-01-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Sugino, Hiroaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Blasiak, Robert;Pittman, Jeremy;Sugino, Hiroaki
一个相对较小的国家集团在国家管辖范围以外的海洋区域（ABNJ）不成比例地活跃，提出了公平问题，而遍布多个国际机构的无数部门法规和准则导致这些地区的生物多样性和资源的保护和利用不平衡。在此背景下，联合国大会于2015年决定开始谈判一项具有法律约束力的国际文书，以养护和保护ABNJ的生物多样性，谈判围绕四个问题展开：（1）海洋遗传资源，包括利益分享问题;（2）区域管理工具等措施，包括海洋保护区;（3）环境影响评估;（4）海洋生物多样性的保护。（4）能力建设和海洋技术转让。然而，我们的分析表明，最不发达国家（LDCs）和小岛屿发展中国家（SIDS）在有关这些问题的区域和国际会议上的代表性明显不足，而有关这些主题的学术文献的作者由经济合作与发展组织（OECD）成员国（97%）主导。对联合国大会决议通过后第一轮谈判期间各代表团发言的统计分析也表明，经合组织成员国的利益与最不发达国家和小岛屿发展中国家的利益有很大不同，这表明代表权不平衡有可能导致扭曲的谈判。此外，限制谈判各方不破坏现有组织的任务，限制了它们的可操作性，并可能阻碍实现雄心勃勃的有时限的承诺，以促进可持续的资源利用和减少不平等（例如，可持续发展目标和爱知目标）。由于ABNJ覆盖了世界一半的表面，符合新法规的利己主义是保护和可持续利用的最有希望的途径，但除非各国认为他们的观点，关注和最佳利益已经反映在谈判达成的协议中，否则仍然不太可能。
A relatively small group of states is disproportionately active in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), raising questions of equity, while a myriad of sectoral regulations and guidelines spread across multiple international bodies has led to uneven conservation and use of biological diversity and resources in these areas. Within this context, the UN General Assembly resolved in 2015 to begin negotiations on an international legally-binding instrument to conserve and protect biodiversity in ABNJ, with the negotiations framed by four issues: (1) marine genetic resources, including questions on the sharing of benefits; (2) measures such as area-based management tools, including marine protected areas; (3) environmental impact assessments; (4) capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. Yet our analysis demonstrates that least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) are significantly under-represented in regional and international meetings on such issues, while the authorship of academic literature on these topics is dominated to an unusual extent by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states (97%). Statistical analysis of delegation statements delivered during the first round of negotiations following the UN General Assembly resolution also illustrates that the interests of OECD member states differ substantially from LDCs and SIDS, suggesting that imbalanced representation has the potential to result in skewed negotiations. Moreover, the restriction on negotiating parties not to undermine the mandate of existing organizations limits their maneuverability, and may hamper progress toward achieving ambitious time-bound commitments to promote sustainable resource use and reduce inequality (e.g., under the Sustainable Development Goals and Aichi Targets). With ABNJ covering half the world's surface, self-interested compliance with new regulations is the most promising pathway to conservation and sustainable use, yet remains unlikely unless states feel their views, concerns and best interests have been reflected in the negotiated agreement.