Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle
Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/joie.12101
复制
发表时间：
2015-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Tamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Tamura
本文研究了一个拍卖平台，其中垄断平台通过调整参与费用和选择拍卖形式来实现利润最大化。卖方拥有关于商品质量的私人信息，每个参与的买方都收到关于他对商品估价的私人信号。拍卖形式的选择决定了交易盈余在买卖双方之间的分配。研究表明，当卖方类型与买方信号关联时，平台可以通过选择一价拍卖或降序拍卖而不是二价拍卖或升序拍卖，向双方收取更高的参与费用。它还研究了允许参与的买家获取关于卖家类型的信息的效果，并表明该平台可以通过限制卖家和买家之间的沟通来向双方收取更高的参与费用。
This paper examines an auction platform in which the monopoly platform maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus between the seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller's type is affiliated with the buyers' signals, the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by choosing a first-price or descending auction rather than a second-price or ascending auction. It also examines the effect of allowing participating buyers to acquire information on the seller's type and shows that the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by restricting communication between the seller and buyers.