The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years
The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years
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DOI：
10.3390/philosophies4020014
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发表时间：
2019-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Taguchi, Shigeru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Froese, Tom;Taguchi, Shigeru
在这篇文章中，我们批判性地评估了在解决人工智能(AI)和机器人学中的意义问题方面所取得的进展。我们仍然对基于深度神经网络和认知机器人的解决方案持怀疑态度，在我们看来，这些解决方案并没有从根本上解决问题。我们同意认知科学的主动方法，即事物对生物来说似乎具有内在的意义，因为它们作为自适应的自生个体而不稳定地存在。但这种方法继承了一个问题，即未能考虑到意义本身如何对代理人的行为产生影响。简而言之，如果生命和心灵被认同为物理上的决定论现象，那么意义本身就没有发挥作用的概念空间。我们认为，这种意义的无能可以通过修改自然的概念来解决，这样生命的宏观尺度就可以用物理上的不确定性来表征。我们考虑这种对身心关系的修正对综合方法的影响。
In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of failing to account for how meaning as such could make a difference for an agent's behavior. In a nutshell, if life and mind are identified with physically deterministic phenomena, then there is no conceptual room for meaning to play a role in its own right. We argue that this impotence of meaning can be addressed by revising the concept of nature such that the macroscopic scale of the living can be characterized by physical indeterminacy. We consider the implications of this revision of the mind-body relationship for synthetic approaches.