Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt
Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2031438
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发表时间：
2013-12
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Hae-Young Byun;Sunhwa Choi;Lee-Seok Hwang;Robert Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hae-Young Byun;Sunhwa Choi;Lee-Seok Hwang;Robert Kim
本文考察了企业集团隶属关系与债务资本成本之间的关系。企业集团的共同保险效应会降低债务成本，而控股股东的侵占行为会提高债务成本。我们发现，与韩国主要企业集团有关联的公司（即，与独立公司相比，大财阀（chaebeurs）的公共债务成本要低得多，这与共同保险的论点一致。我们还研究了几个因素，影响集团隶属关系和债务成本之间的关系，包括一个公司的不确定性的未来收益的债权人，可抵押的收入，集团层面的资源，并在集团结构中的位置。结果与共保解释一致。我们的研究强调，企业集团在债务市场中的作用不同于所有权结构的作用。
This paper examines the relation between business group affiliation and the cost of debt capital. The co-insurance effect associated with business groups can reduce the cost of debt, while expropriation by controlling shareholders can raise the cost of debt. We find that firms affiliated with major Korean business groups (i.e., chaebols) enjoy a substantially lower cost of public debt than do independent firms, consistent with the co-insurance argument. We also examine several factors that influence the relation between group affiliation and the cost of debt, including a firm's uncertainty about the future payoffs of debtholders, pledgeable income, group-level resources, and position in the group structure. The results are all consistent with the co-insurance explanation. Our study highlights that the role of business groups in the debt market is distinct from the role of ownership structure.