Determining the desired amount of parking using game theory
Determining the desired amount of parking using game theory
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DOI：
10.1061/(asce)0733-9488(2006)132:1(53
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发表时间：
2006-03-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Mahalel, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hollander, Y;Prashker, JN;Mahalel, D
寻求最优停车政策的问题在这里被表述为政府和旅行者之间的Stackelberg博弈。政府希望在保持强大的城市中心的同时，鼓励公交乘客出行；与大多数帮助确定停车政策的现有工具不同，拟议的博弈包括对政府目标的明确量化表述。每个出行者都希望从自己对目的地和交通方式的选择中获得最大效用，并通过Logit模型得到所有出行者的选择分布。博弈论的实践与交通模型中关于单个出行者的效用与所有出行者的选择分布之间的关系的常见假设之间存在着根本的区别。这种差异在这里通过代表旅行者的玩家及其目标函数的定义来解决。这款游戏的一个简单版本在24个虚构的交通和城市条件场景中进行了测试。
The problem of seeking an optimal parking policy is formulated here as a Stackelberg game between the government and the travelers. The government wishes to encourage transit ridership while keeping a strong urban center; unlike most existing tools that assist in determining parking policies, the proposed game includes an explicit quantitative formulation of the governmental objective. Each traveler wishes to gain a maximum utility from his choice of destination and transportation mode, and the choice distribution of all travelers is obtained by Logit model. A fundamental difference exists between Game Theory practice and common assumptions used in transportation modeling regarding the relationship between a single traveler's utility and the choice distribution of all travelers. This difference is tackled here through the definition of the player that represents the travelers and its objective function. A simple version of the game is tested in 24 imaginary scenarios of transportation and urban conditions.