Overlapping International Environmental Agreements
Overlapping International Environmental Agreements
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重叠的国际环境协定
DOI：
10.1561/102.00000063
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
X. Zhu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Silva;X. Zhu
完美联盟证明纳什均衡（PCPN）的概念进行了扩展，以允许出现重叠的联盟在均衡。我们研究了环境协定的效率和稳定性，以控制相关大陆和全球污染物的排放。我们发现，一组PCPN均衡包括完美的强纳什（PSN）均衡，如果国家从大陆污染的损害是足够大的相对于国家从全球污染的损害。我们还表明：（一）大陆协议可能是完美的联盟证明下，限制少得多的情况下;（二）完美的纳什均衡完全重叠的协议可能是上级的大联盟的最优分配存在的联盟运营成本;和（三）PSN均衡可能仍然出现在一个更大的世界，如果联盟的形成产生R&D溢出效益。
The perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental and global pollutants. We show that set of PCPN equilibria includes perfectly strong Nash (PSN) equilibria if the national damage from continental pollution is sufficiently large relative to the national damage from global pollution. We also show that: (i) continental agreements may be perfectly coalition-proof under much less restrictive circumstances; (ii) perfect Nash equilibria for fully overlapped agreements may be superior to the Grand Coalition's optimal allocation in the presence of coalitional operation costs; and (iii) PSN equilibria may still emerge in a larger world if coalition formation yields R&D spillover benefits.