DVFS Frequently Leaks Secrets: Hertzbleed Attacks Beyond SIKE, Cryptography, and CPU-Only Data

DVFS Frequently Leaks Secrets: Hertzbleed Attacks Beyond SIKE, Cryptography, and CPU-Only Data
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DOI:
10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179326
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发表时间:
2023-05
期刊:
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Yingchen Wang;Riccardo Paccagnella;Alan Wandke;Zhao Gang;Grant Garrett-Grossman;Christopher W. Fletcher;David Kohlbrenner;H. Shacham
Yingchen Wang;Riccardo Paccagnella;Alan Wandke;Zhao Gang;Grant Garrett-Grossman;Christopher W. Fletcher;David Kohlbrenner;H. Shacham
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yingchen Wang;Riccardo Paccagnella;Alan Wandke;Zhao Gang;Grant Garrett-Grossman;Christopher W. Fletcher;David Kohlbrenner;H. Shacham

文献摘要

相似文献

最近的Hertzbleed揭露了远程定时分析如何能够揭示以前只有本地功率分析才能获得的秘密信息。在最坏的情况下,这将从根本上破坏恒定时间编程原则以及依赖于这些原则的许多已部署程序。但并非所有希望都破灭了。赫茨布尔依赖于难以利用的粗粒度、有噪声的信道。事实上,赫茨布莱德的论文需要一个定制的密码分析来攻击一个特定的密码系统(SIKE)。因此,目前尚不清楚Hertzbleed是否对更广泛的安全生态系统构成威胁。在本文中,我们证明了Hertzbleed的影响是广泛的,不仅影响SIKE以外的密码系统,而且影响加密之外的程序,甚至发生在CPU内核之外的计算。首先,我们展示了其他密码系统实现中的潜在小工具(特别是“恒定时间”ECDSA和经典McEliece)如何与现有的密码分析相结合,以引导对这些密码系统的赫兹出血攻击。其次,我们演示了集成GPU上的功耗如何影响cpu上的频率,以及如何利用谷歌Chrome上的“恒定时间”SVG过滤器来执行第一次跨原点像素窃取攻击。
The recent Hertzbleed disclosure demonstrates how remote-timing analysis can reveal secret information previously only accessible to local-power analysis. At worst, this constitutes a fundamental break in the constant-time programming principles and the many deployed programs that rely on them. But all hope is not lost. Hertzbleed relies on a coarse-grained, noisy channel that is difficult to exploit. Indeed, the Hertzbleed paper required a bespoke cryptanalysis to attack a specific cryptosystem (SIKE). Thus, it remains unclear if Hertzbleed represents a threat to the broader security ecosystem.In this paper, we demonstrate that Hertzbleed’s effects are wide ranging, not only affecting cryptosystems beyond SIKE, but also programs beyond cryptography, and even computations occurring outside the CPU cores. First, we demonstrate how latent gadgets in other cryptosystem implementations— specifically "constant-time" ECDSA and Classic McEliece— can be combined with existing cryptanalysis to bootstrap Hertzbleed attacks on those cryptosystems. Second, we demonstrate how power consumption on the integrated GPU influences frequency on the CPU—and how this can be used to perform the first cross-origin pixel stealing attacks leveraging "constant-time" SVG filters on Google Chrome.