The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies
The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies
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DOI：
10.1080/09515089608573181
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发表时间：
1996-06-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Meltzoff, AN
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gallagher, S;Meltzoff, AN
最近的发展心理学研究发现，有证据表明，存在一个先天系统，可以解释早期婴儿模仿的可能性，以及在先天性肢体缺失的情况下幻肢的存在。这些结果挑战了关于身体图式和身体意象的地位和发展的传统假设，以及关于知觉经验和运动能力之间的翻译过程的性质的传统假设。梅洛-庞蒂深受其发展心理学研究的影响，他的知觉现象学与身体图式的概念密切相关，他接受了这些传统假设。它们也为他关于自我和他人经验的哲学结论提供了信息。我们根据发展心理学的最新研究，重新审视了理解自我和他人所涉及的问题。更具体地说，我们的重新审视挑战了梅洛-庞蒂的一些结论，并提出，与此相反，新生儿能够在自我和非自我之间进行基本的区分。
Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability. Merleau-Ponty, who was greatly influenced by his study of developmental psychology, and whose phenomenology of perception was closely tied to the concept of the body schema, accepted these traditional assumptions. They also informed his philosophical conclusions concerning the experience of self and others. We re-examine issues involved in understanding self and others in light of the more recent research in developmental psychology. More specifically our re-examination challenges a number of Merleau-Ponty's conclusions and suggests, in contrast, that the newborn infant is capable of a rudimentary differentiation between self and non-self.