Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings
Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings
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具有社会拟排序的阿罗定理
DOI：
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Weymark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Weymark
阿罗定理中的集体合理性要求被弱化为要求社会准序（一种自反传递但不一定完全的二元关系）。这种弱化导致了这样一个群体的存在：(a)当群体的所有成员严格地偏好其中一种选择时，社会也是如此；(b)当群体的两个成员对一对选择有相反的严格偏好时，这对选择在社会上就没有排名。这个定理随后被用来提供强帕累托规则的公理化。这些结果与吉巴德的寡头定理和森的帕累托扩展规则的公理化进行了比较和对比。
The collective rationality requirement in Arrow's theorem is weakened to demanding a social quasi-ordering (a reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete binary relation). This weakening leads to the existence of a group such that (a) whenever all members of the group strictly prefer one alternative to another then so does society and (b) whenever two members of the group have opposite strict preferences over a pair of alternatives then the pair is socially not ranked. This theorem is then used to provide an axiomatization of the strong Pareto rule. These results are compared and contrasted to Gibbard's oligarchy theorem and Sen's axiomatization of the Pareto extension rule.