Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
复制标题
石油不是诅咒：苏联继承国的所有权结构和制度
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
George Chuchman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
George Chuchman
宝琳·琼斯·梁 (Pauline Jones Luong) 和艾丽卡·温塔尔 (Erica Weinthal)。石油不是诅咒：苏联继承国的所有权结构和制度。剑桥比较政治研究。纽约：剑桥大学出版社，2010 年。425 页。地图。引用的作品。指数。 29.99 美元，纸质。在这本书中，Pauline Jones Luong 和 Erika Weinthal 对大型“资源诅咒”文献做出了重大贡献，这些文献已演变为解释矿产资源丰富的国家几乎总是比自然资源匮乏的国家在经济和政治发展、稳定和长期可持续性方面遇到更大问题的情况。除了糟糕的经济表现之外，广泛观察到的资源财富（特别是石油）的负面后果包括“……不平衡的增长、贫困人口、弱国家和独裁政权”（第 1 页）。在第一章中，作者对这些文献进行了回顾，表明许多不同的解释已成为“既定资源诅咒论”的一部分（第 3 页），但也认为各种批评家认为这些 那些不认识或没有适当强调机构在解释资源诅咒方面的作用的观念都是不切实际的。作者认为，支持者和批评者都认为，在矿产资源丰富的国家，这些制度薄弱、缺位或停滞不前，因此无法限制统治精英过度依赖矿产部门和进行浪费性支出，也无法建立强有力的财政制度来规范国家明智地征税、支出和投资的能力。他们认为，这相当于假设所有矿产资源丰富的国家都将成为食利国家（完全依赖于其治理财政体系中资源收入的产生），当资源价格下跌和资源“繁荣”变成资源“萧条”时，无法采取有效的稳定政策来应对。Jones Luong和Weinthal提出了一系列挑战这一共识的问题，并建议根据五个石油资源丰富的新独立国家的经验来解决这些问题 前苏联国家——阿塞拜疆、哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯、土库曼斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦。他们揭示了这样的论点：尽管与所有其他苏联继承国一样，这五个石油资源丰富的国家继承了薄弱的制度，但他们的经验表明，“即使那些矿产资源丰富的国家没有继承强有力的制度，仍然可以建立它们”（第4页）。作者进一步指出，他们对 1990 年代初期到 2005 年这些继承国家财政制度的不同发展的研究支持了他们的“矿产资源丰富国家的制度不是其财富本身的产物，而是所有权结构的产物”的论点（第 4 页）。第一章的其余部分重点讨论这些替代假设，并制定了一个定量框架，用于检验和分析经验证据，而不仅仅是这些经验证据。 包括石油资源丰富的后苏联国家，而且还包括一个更大的石油资源丰富国家的全球数据库，时间范围从二十世纪初开始。 ……
Pauline Jones Luong and Erica Weinthal. Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 425 pp. Maps. Works cited. Index. $29.99, paper.In this book, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal make a major contribution to the large "resource curse" literature that has evolved to explain a condition whereby mineral-rich countries almost always experience greater problems in both economic and political development, stability, and long-run sustainability, than countries poorly-endowed with natural resources. Besides poor economic performance, the widely observed negative consequences of resource wealth, petroleum in particular, include "[...] unbalanced growth, impoverished populations, weak states, and authoritarian regimes" (p. 1).In chapter 1 , the authors provide a review of this literature, indicating that many diverse explanations have become part of the "established resource curse thesis" (p. 3), but also argue that various critics, who have contended that these notions either do not recognize or do not properly emphasize the role of institutions in explaining the resource curse, are off the mark. According to the authors, both proponents and critics assume that in mineral-rich countries these institutions are weak, absent, or stagnant and so incapable of constraining the governing elites from relying excessively on the mineral sector and engaging in wasteful spending, as well as of building strong fiscal regimes that regulate the ability of the state to tax, spend, and invest wisely. They argue this amounts to assuming that all mineral-rich states will become rentier states (reliant exclusively on generation of resource revenues in their governing fiscal systems), unable to respond with effective stabilization policies when resource prices fall and resource "booms" become resource "busts."Jones Luong and Weinthal pose a series of questions that challenges this consensus and propose to address them based on the experience of five petroleum-rich newly independent states of the former Soviet Union - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. They unveil the argument that even though, like all the other Soviet successor states, these five petroleum-rich states inherited weak institutions, their experience suggests that "even those mineral-rich states not inheriting strong institutions can nonetheless build them"(p. 4). The authors further argue that their study of the divergent development of the fiscal regimes in these successor states from early 1 990s to 2005 supports their "contention that institutions in mineral-rich states are not a product of their wealth per se, but rather ownership structure" (p. 4).The remainder of chapter 1 focuses on these alternative hypotheses and maps out a quantitative framework for testing and analysis of the evidence on the experience of, not only these petroleum-rich post-Soviet countries, but also of a larger global database of petroleum-rich countries, and over a period from the beginning of the twentieth century. …