Practicing democratic community norms: Third-party conflict management and successful settlements

Practicing democratic community norms: Third-party conflict management and successful settlements
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实践民主社区规范:第三方冲突管理和成功解决

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发表时间:
2008
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通讯作者:
Mark J C Crescenzi
Mark J C Crescenzi
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文献类型:
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作者:
S. Mitchell;K. Kadera;Mark J C Crescenzi

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在本文中,我们调查的方法,聚合民主力量影响dyadiclevel互动。我们研究了全球民主社会和第三方参与试图解决可能导致暴力的二元索赔之间的因果关系。我们假设,一个强大的民主社会及其机构,使第三方解决的尝试更频繁和成功,这些第三方调解人很可能是民主国家或国际机构。使用来自ICOW项目以及Kadera,Crescenzi和Shannon(2003)的数据,我们测试了这些假设,并找到了广泛但不普遍的支持,即当民主社区有能力影响国际政治时,它通过传播解决争端的民主社会规范来实现。自从经典的自由主义者提出国家的共和治理是“永久和平”的基础以来,大量有经验头脑的学者研究了这一主张。几乎无一例外,他们在分析的一元层面上几乎没有得到支持,而在二元层面上得到了有力的支持:尽管民主国家和非民主国家一样有可能参与冲突,但它们不会互相争斗(例如,Chan 1984,Maoz和Russett 1993,Morgan和Schwebach 1992,Russett和Oneal 2001)。康德([1784] 1991,[1795] 1991,和[1797] 1991)将民主和平的原始愿景作为一种系统现象,一种由共和(代议制)政府组成的发达国际社会所产生的安宁(哈里森,2002;亨特利,1996)。然而,直到最近才进行了严格的、系统的民主和平分析。这些最近的调查表明,增强全球民主最终会产生和平的效果,尽管对于和平的道路是否包括冲突的单调减少或战争的最初增加到某个临界值,然后战争水平下降,存在一些争论。Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Kadera,Crescenzi,and Shannon 2003; Mitchell,Gates,and Hegre 1999)。尽管如此,还有很多东西需要学习。我们还不太了解实现系统和平的机制。本文试图研究聚合民主力量产生和平利益的过程。我们的理论认为,一个“强大的民主共同体”(Kadera,Crescenzi,and Shannon 2003)培育了国际社会中民主规范的扩展。虽然有多种方式来实践民主规范,我们集中在本文的冲突缓解策略。特别是,我们要问,民主社会的力量如何影响国家允许第三方参与解决有争议问题的意愿?
In this paper we investigate the methods by which aggregate democratic forces influence dyadiclevel interactions. We examine the causal linkage between a global democratic community and the involvement of third parties in attempts to settle dyadic claims that may otherwise lead to violence. We hypothesize that a strong democratic community and its institutions make third party settlement attempts more frequent and successful, and that these third party mediators are likely to be democracies or international institutions. Using data from the ICOW project as well as from Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon (2003), we test these hypotheses and find broad but not universal support for the notion that when the democratic community has the ability to influence international politics, it does so through the propagation of democratic societal norms of dispute resolution. ince the classic Liberals proposed republican governance of states as a foundation for a “perpetual peace,” a plethora of empirically minded scholars have investigated this claim. Almost without exception, they have found little support at the monadic level of analysis and strong support at the dyadic level: although democracies are just as likely as nondemocracies to participate in conflicts, they do not fight each other (e.g., Chan 1984, Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Schwebach 1992, Russett and Oneal 2001). Kant ([1784] 1991, [1795] 1991, and [1797] 1991) exemplifies the original vision of the democratic peace as a systemic phenomenon, a tranquility produced by a developed international society of republican (representative) governments (Harrison, 2002; Huntley, 1996). Yet, rigorous systemic democratic peace analyses have only recently been conducted. These recent investigations indicate that augmenting global democracy ultimately has a pacifying effect, though there is some debate about whether the path to peace involves a monotonic lessening of conflict or initial increases in warfare up to some critical value after which war levels subside (cf. Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999). Nonetheless, much is left to learn. We do not yet know much about the mechanisms by which systemic peace is achieved. This paper seeks to investigate the processes by which aggregate democratic forces produce pacific benefits. S We theorize that a “strong democratic community” (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003) nurtures the expansion of democratic norms in international society. While there are multiple ways to practice democratic norms, we focus this paper on conflict alleviation strategies. In particular, we ask how does the strength of the democratic community affect the willingness of states to allow third party involvement in the resolution of contentious issues?