Practicing democratic community norms: Third-party conflict management and successful settlements
Practicing democratic community norms: Third-party conflict management and successful settlements
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实践民主社区规范:第三方冲突管理和成功解决
DOI:
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发表时间:
2008
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Mark J C Crescenzi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
S. Mitchell;K. Kadera;Mark J C Crescenzi
In this paper we investigate the methods by which aggregate democratic forces influence dyadiclevel interactions. We examine the causal linkage between a global democratic community and the involvement of third parties in attempts to settle dyadic claims that may otherwise lead to violence. We hypothesize that a strong democratic community and its institutions make third party settlement attempts more frequent and successful, and that these third party mediators are likely to be democracies or international institutions. Using data from the ICOW project as well as from Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon (2003), we test these hypotheses and find broad but not universal support for the notion that when the democratic community has the ability to influence international politics, it does so through the propagation of democratic societal norms of dispute resolution. ince the classic Liberals proposed republican governance of states as a foundation for a “perpetual peace,” a plethora of empirically minded scholars have investigated this claim. Almost without exception, they have found little support at the monadic level of analysis and strong support at the dyadic level: although democracies are just as likely as nondemocracies to participate in conflicts, they do not fight each other (e.g., Chan 1984, Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Schwebach 1992, Russett and Oneal 2001). Kant ([1784] 1991, [1795] 1991, and [1797] 1991) exemplifies the original vision of the democratic peace as a systemic phenomenon, a tranquility produced by a developed international society of republican (representative) governments (Harrison, 2002; Huntley, 1996). Yet, rigorous systemic democratic peace analyses have only recently been conducted. These recent investigations indicate that augmenting global democracy ultimately has a pacifying effect, though there is some debate about whether the path to peace involves a monotonic lessening of conflict or initial increases in warfare up to some critical value after which war levels subside (cf. Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999). Nonetheless, much is left to learn. We do not yet know much about the mechanisms by which systemic peace is achieved. This paper seeks to investigate the processes by which aggregate democratic forces produce pacific benefits. S We theorize that a “strong democratic community” (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003) nurtures the expansion of democratic norms in international society. While there are multiple ways to practice democratic norms, we focus this paper on conflict alleviation strategies. In particular, we ask how does the strength of the democratic community affect the willingness of states to allow third party involvement in the resolution of contentious issues?