Impact of RMA on conventional deterrence : a theoretical analysis
Impact of RMA on conventional deterrence : a theoretical analysis
复制标题
RMA 对常规威慑的影响：理论分析
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Pardesi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Pardesi
这项研究旨在从理论上研究，如果拥有RMA-ed军队的国家面临常规战争的前景，威慑是否会占上风。为了回答这个问题，本研究在三种理论情景下分析了转型对常规威慑的影响--(1)有能力的RMA常规军事对无RMA能力的常规军事(前者是核国家或无核国家，后者是非核国家)，(2)两支能够RMA的常规军队(两个国家都是无核国家)，以及(3)两个能够RMA的常规军队(两个国家都是核国家)。这项研究的结论是，目前的国防转型是革命性的，因为它允许两个核武器国家(包括大国)之间发生有限的常规武装冲突，并因此试图恢复常规军事力量在国际政治中的作用。另一方面，类似于核革命，两个非核交战国拥有军事革命的能力，很可能使它们之间具有无限军事目标的大规模常规武装冲突变得不可想象。然而，这项研究警告说，当敌对的二元体中只有一个国家具有RMA能力时，威慑就会减弱。此外，在任何涉及有军事革命能力的国家的二元论中，当有军事革命能力的国家考虑对其对手采取有限目标(政治和/或军事)的战略时，威慑力就会减弱。当它考虑用空中力量和导弹袭击(低成本、低风险)发动一场有限的战争，而不是为了领土扩张而发动一场有限的战争时，这种倾向更加明显。*Manjeet Singh Pardesi自2003年8月以来一直担任新加坡国防和战略研究所副研究员。他最初在新加坡南洋理工大学接受电气电子工程师培训，在那里他获得了新加坡航空公司/海王星东方航空公司的奖学金。此后，他在新加坡国防与战略研究所获得新加坡技术工程的奖学金，获得了战略研究硕士学位。他的研究兴趣包括军事革命和大国政治(重点是美国、中国和印度)。他关于无人机的文章最近发表在美国空军的《航空航天力量杂志》上。他还撰写了许多关于军事革命以及印度外交和安全政策的评论，其中一些发表在新加坡的《海峡时报》和韩国的《韩国先驱报》上。他曾在新加坡SAFTI军事学院讲授三军参谋课程和指挥参谋课程，并主持讨论小组。
This research aims to theoretically study if deterrence will prevail if and when states with RMA-ed militaries are faced with the prospect of conventional war. To answer this question, this study analyzes the impact of transformation on conventional deterrence in the event of a military standoff for three theoretical scenarios – (1) RMA capable conventional military vs. RMA-incapable conventional military (with the former state being nuclear or non-nuclear and with the latter being non-nuclear), (2) two RMA-capable conventional militaries (both states non-nuclear), and (3) two RMA-capable conventional militaries (both states nuclear). The study concludes that the current defense transformation is revolutionary simply because it permits the possibility of a limited conventional armed conflict between two nuclear weapons states (including great powers) and as such attempts to resuscitate the role of conventional military power in international politics. On the other hand, analogous to the nuclear revolution, the possession of RMA capabilities by two non-nuclear belligerents is likely to render large-scale conventional armed conflicts with unlimited military objectives between them unthinkable. However, this study warns that deterrence is weakened when only one state in an adversarial dyad is RMA-capable. Moreover, in any dyad involving RMA-capable states, deterrence is weakened when the RMA-capable state contemplates a strategy of limited aims (political and/or military) vis-à-vis its adversary. This tendency is all the more pronounced when it is contemplating a limited war waged with air power and missile strikes (low-cost, low-risk) than a limited war for territorial gains. *************************** Manjeet Singh Pardesi has been an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, since August 2003. He was initially trained as an Electrical and Electronic Engineer at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he studied on a Singapore Airlines/Neptune Orient Lines Scholarship. Thereafter, he pursued an MSc in Strategic Studies on a scholarship from Singapore Technologies Engineering at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. His research interests include Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and great power politics (with an emphasis on the US, China, and India). His article on unmanned aerial vehicles was recently published in the Air & Space Power Journal of the US Air Force. He has also written a number of commentaries on RMA and India’s foreign and security policy, some of which have been published in The Straits Times, Singapore, and The Korea Herald, South Korea. He has lectured, conducted tutorials, and led discussion groups of the Tri-Service Staff Course and the Command and Staff Course at the SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore.