Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders
Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders
复制标题
行业领袖游说监管改革
DOI：
10.1007/s11149-017-9334-x
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Matsumura Toshihiro and Yamagishi Atsushi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
阿部修人;稲倉典子;遠田俊樹;外木暁幸;Matsumura Toshihiro and Ogawa Akira;Akiyuki Tonogi;外木 暁幸;Matsumura Toshihiro and Yamagishi Atsushi
我们研究了一个自由进入的市场，在这个市场中，现任者游说监管改革，平等地影响所有公司的成本。首先，我们研究了一个模型，在该模型中，游说影响边际成本，并且现任者在追随者进入之前进行生产。我们发现，在位者有动机削弱或加强监管取决于简单的需求条件。接下来，我们讨论古诺竞争的情况下，并说明成本不对称可能会导致在职者从事成本提高游说。最后，我们研究了一个模型，在该模型中，游说影响固定成本，并发现现任者有动机加强监管，除非他们是大大低于追随者的效率。
We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents lobby for regulatory changes that affect the cost for all firms equally. First, we investigate a model in which the lobbying affects marginal costs and incumbents produce before followers enter. We find that incumbents have an incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations depending on the simple demand condition. Next, we discuss the case of Cournot competition and illustrate that cost asymmetry may induce incumbents to engage in cost-raising lobbying. Finally, we examine a model in which lobbying affects fixed costs and find that incumbents have an incentive to strengthen regulations unless they are substantially less efficient than followers are.