The Role of Deception in Decision Theory
The Role of Deception in Decision Theory
复制标题
欺骗在决策理论中的作用
DOI：
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
I. Greenberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Greenberg
决策者必须从一组备选方案中选择一个。收益将取决于恶意对手选择的状态。这个对手可能会使用欺骗手段，使决策者错误地认识到特定状态被选择的可能性。这种欺骗的价值是根据回报矩阵和这些被误解的可能性来定义的。一个例子，基于一个简化的描述欺骗计划周围的诺曼底入侵在1944年包括说明的概念。
A decision maker must select one of a set of alternatives. The payoff will depend upon the state chosen by a malevolent opponent. This opponent might use deception to cause the decision maker to misperceive the likelihood that the specific state was chosen. The value of this deception is defined in terms of the payoff matrix and these misperceived likelihoods. An example, based on a simplified description of the deception planning surrounding the Normandy invasion in 1944 is included to illustrate the concepts.