Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study

Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study
复制标题

DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.003
复制
发表时间:
2019-05-01
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Kesten, Onur
Kesten, Onur
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chen, Yan;Kesten, Onur

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

自2001年以来,中国许多省份已经从“顺序”向“平行”的择校或大学录取机制过渡。受这个自然实验的启发,我们在实验室中评估了顺序(立即接受,IA),并行(PA)和延迟接受(DA)机制。我们发现,参与者是最有可能透露他们的喜好如实DA下,其次是PA,然后DA。虽然稳定性比较也遵循相同的顺序,效率比较不同的环境。无论指标,PA的性能是强大的IA和DA之间的夹层。此外,53%的受试者采用PA下的保险策略,使他们至少以及他们可以保证自己在IA下。这些结果有助于解释中国最近的择校和大学录取改革。(C)2019作者(S)由爱思唯尔公司出版
Since 2001, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a "sequential" to a "parallel" school choice or college admissions mechanism. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. We find that participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by PA and then DA. While stability comparisons also follow the same order, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. Regardless of the metrics, the performance of PA is robustly sandwiched between IA and DA. Furthermore, 53% of our subjects adopt an insurance strategy under PA, making them at least as well off as what they could guarantee themselves under IA. These results help explain the recent reforms in Chinese school choice and college admissions. (C) 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.