An experimental comparison of rebate and matching in charitable giving: The case of Japan

An experimental comparison of rebate and matching in charitable giving: The case of Japan
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慈善捐赠中回扣与匹配的实验比较:以日本为例

DOI:
10.1007/s42973-021-00085-9
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
The Japanese Economic Review
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Fumio Ohtake
Fumio Ohtake
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
Shusaku Sasaki;Hirofumi Kurokawa;Fumio Ohtake

文献摘要

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本研究以日本全国为样本,对旨在降低捐款价格的回扣和匹配方案进行了实验性比较。标准经济学理论预测,当两种方案的捐赠价格相当时,它们对个人捐赠行为的影响是相同的。然而,我们通过互联网对2300名日本居民进行了一项激励经济实验,发现通过增加第三方捐款来降低捐款价格的匹配,与通过第三方退款来降低捐款价格的回扣相比,增加了个人的捐款支出。实验结果表明,与对照组相比,50%折扣处理的捐赠支出减少了约126日元,而在捐赠价格与50%折扣基本相同的1:1匹配处理中,支出反而增加了约56日元。这一趋势与以前比较两种方案的实验研究结果一致。我们进一步实证证实,1:1匹配超过50%的回扣的优越性是不决定性的影响,参与者的混淆或误解,或预算约束线的差异,这两个计划。虽然日本政府此前已经丰富了退税的内容,但日本民众的捐款水平在国际范围内仍然较低。基于本研究的发现,我们讨论了实施匹配到社会有效地鼓励他们的捐赠行为的可能性。
This study uses a Japanese nationwide sample and experimentally compares rebate and matching, both of which are schemes intended to lower the price of monetary donation. Standard economic theory predicts that the two schemes will have the same effect on individuals’ donation behavior when their donation price is equivalent. However, we conduct an incentivized economic experiment through the Internet on 2300 Japanese residents, and find that matching, which lowers the donation price by adding a contribution from a third-party, increases individuals’ donation expenditures compared to rebate, which lowers it through a refund from a third-party. The experimental result shows that the donation expenditure in a 50% rebate treatment drops by approximately 126 Japanese yen compared to the control, while in a 1:1 matching treatment with essentially the same price of donation as the 50% rebate, the expenditure conversely rises by approximately 56 Japanese yen. This tendency is consistent with the results of previous experimental studies comparing the two schemes. We further empirically confirm that the superiority of 1:1 matching over 50% rebate is not conclusively influenced by the participants’ confusion or misunderstanding, or budget constraint lines’ difference between the two schemes. Although the Japanese government has previously enriched rebate’s content, the level of monetary donations by the Japanese people is still low on an international scale. Based on this study’s findings, we discuss the possibility that implementing matching into the society effectively encourages their donation behavior.