Models of parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation. How different drafting models and forms of government shape them

Models of parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation. How different drafting models and forms of government shape them
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DOI:
10.1080/20508840.2021.1904553
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发表时间:
2021-03-26
影响因子:
4
通讯作者:
Albanesi, Enrico
Albanesi, Enrico
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Albanesi, Enrico

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这篇文章的目的是为下一期特刊做好铺垫,该特刊包含四篇论文,涉及议会对不同司法管辖区立法质量审查的研究。在欧洲大陆,议会(尽管范围相当不同:意大利和西班牙等国的议会更多,德国等国的议会更少)在审查立法质量方面制定了更深入的方法,即与威斯敏斯特司法管辖区相比,制定了一套在下游审查立法的工具、标准和机构。在后者,高标准的立法质量通过由议会法律顾问起草法案来保证上游,尽管在联合王国,目前正在就加强议会对立法质量的审查的机会进行辩论。这项研究的假设是,由于起草模式和在那里建立的政府形式,上述议会审查模式在这些司法管辖区的形成是不同的。在这种背景下,美国国会是一种非常不同的动物:由于总统制立法程序的特殊性,国会的审查依赖于多个政党。之所以委托这里的文章,是为了现在更大范围地测试上述假设,这些假设已经在以前一篇主要关于意大利的文章中得到了部分证明(E.阿尔巴esi,《议会对欧洲立法质量的审查》(2021年)《规约法评论》)。这一次的分析将集中在欧洲大陆的两个议会制(西班牙和德国),一个司法管辖区属于议会顾问/威斯敏斯特模式(加拿大)和一个总统制(美国)。这里发表的文章似乎在更大范围内支持了前述假设。关于加拿大的文章还有助于反思加强议会对威斯敏斯特司法管辖区立法质量的审查的机会。
The aim of this article is to set the scene for the following special issue, which contains four papers relating to research on parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation in different jurisdictions. In Continental Europe, Parliaments (although in a rather different range: more in countries such as Italy and Spain, less in countries such as Germany) have developed a more-in-depth approach in scrutinising the quality of legislation, i.e. a set of tools, standards and bodies to scrutinise it downstream, than that of Westminster jurisdictions. In the latter, a high-standard quality of legislation is guaranteed upstream by having bills drafted by Parliamentary Counsel, although in the United Kingdom there is currently a debate concerning the opportunity to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation. The hypotheses of this research were that the aforementioned models of parliamentary scrutiny are differently shaped in those jurisdictions due to the drafting model and the form of government established there. Against this background, the United States Congress is a very different animal: due to the peculiarities of the legislative process in the presidential system, the scrutiny in Congress relies on multiple parties. The reason why articles have been commissioned here is to test now on a larger scale the aforementioned hypotheses, which have already been partially proved in a previous article mainly concerning Italy (E. Albanesi, 'Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Quality of Legislation within Europe' (2021) Statute Law Review). This time the analysis will focus on two Continental European parliamentary systems (Spain and Germany), one jurisdiction belonging to the Parliamentary Counsel/Westminster model (Canada) and one presidential system (the U.S.). The articles published here seem to support on a larger scale the aforementioned hypotheses. The article on Canada also helps reflect upon the opportunity to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny of the quality of legislation in Westminster jurisdictions.