Sound Auction Specification and Implementation
Sound Auction Specification and Implementation
复制标题
完善的拍卖规范和实施
DOI:
10.1145/2764468.2764511
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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Caminati M
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Caminati M
We introduce `formal methods' of mechanized reasoning from computer science to address two problems in auction design and practice: is a given auction design soundly specified, possessing its intended properties; and, is the design faithfully implemented when actually run? Failure on either front can be hugely costly in large auctions. In the familiar setting of the combinatorial Vickrey auction, we use a mechanized reasoner, Isabelle, to first ensure that the auction has a set of desired properties (e.g. allocating all items at non-negative prices), and to then generate verified executable code directly from the specified design. Having established the expected results in a known context, we intend next to use formal methods to verify new auction designs.
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1999
期刊:
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影响因子:
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
arXiv: Metric Geometry
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
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