An Economic Argument for Affirmative Action
An Economic Argument for Affirmative Action
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平权行动的经济论据
DOI：
10.1177/1043463192004002004
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
R. Vohra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dean Phillips Foster;R. Vohra
本文提出了一个模型，涉及雇主和两类工人，除了标签一样。雇主选择雇用谁，工人选择是否投资于培训。在一个均衡中，雇主歧视，作者表明，这是帕累托劣于另一个均衡，没有歧视发生。根据这一意见，提出了扶持行动的论点。
This article presents a model involving employers and two classes of workers, alike except for labels. Employers choose whom to hire and workers choose whether to invest in training. At one equilibrium, employers discriminate, which, the authors show, is Pareto inferior to another equilibrium where no discrimination occurs. On the basis of this observation, an argument for affirmative action is advanced.