Uncertainty in Multicommodity Routing Networks: When Does It Help?
Uncertainty in Multicommodity Routing Networks: When Does It Help?
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DOI：
10.1109/tac.2019.2962102
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发表时间：
2020-11
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
S. Sekar;Liyuan Zheng;L. Ratliff;Baosen Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Sekar;Liyuan Zheng;L. Ratliff;Baosen Zhang
本文研究了具有不确定用户的多商品自私路由博弈中的均衡行为，其中每个用户通过一个乘因子高估或低估了他们的拥塞成本。令人惊讶的是，我们发现不同方向的不确定性对均衡的影响在性质上是不同的。也就是说，与不确定性增加低效率的通常观念相反，当用户高估他们的成本时，网络拥塞会减少。另一方面，对成本的低估导致拥堵加剧。我们将这些结果应用于城市交通网络，其中司机对拥堵成本有不同的估计。针对旨在解决拥堵的动态定价政策，我们的研究结果表明，用户对这些价格的感知会显著影响政策的有效性，“面对不确定性的谨慎”导致有利的网络条件。
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multicommodity selfish routing game with uncertain users, where each user over- or underestimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that uncertainties in different directions have qualitatively distinct impacts on equilibria. Namely, contrary to the usual notion that uncertainty increases inefficiencies, network congestion decreases when users overestimate their costs. On the other hand, underestimation of costs leads to increased congestion. We apply these results to urban transportation networks, where drivers have different estimates about the cost of congestion. In light of the dynamic pricing policies aimed at tackling congestion, our results indicate that users' perception of these prices can significantly impact the policy's efficacy, and “caution in the face of uncertainty” leads to favorable network conditions.